College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2012

The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil
Recognition of Adolescent Marriage
Vivian E. Hamilton
William & Mary Law School, vhamilton@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Hamilton, Vivian E., "The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of Adolescent Marriage" (2012). Faculty
Publications. 1430.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1430

Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

THE AGE OF MARITAL CAPACITY: RECONSIDERING
CIVIL RECOGNITION OF ADOLESCENT MARRIAGE
VIVIAN E. HAMILTON∗

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1818
I. AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE IN CONTEXT ............................................. 1823
A. Legal History of Marital Age Regulation .................................. 1823
1. Canon Law, Common Law, and Early Statutory Law......... 1824
2. American Colonies and Early States ................................... 1828
3. Modern Regulation .............................................................. 1831
B. Economic Influences on Age at First Marriage ........................ 1833
C. Evolution of the Meaning and Function of Marriage ................ 1836
1. Essential Functional Institution ........................................... 1837
2. The Rise of Companionship ................................................ 1838
3. Negotiated Spousal Roles .................................................... 1839
II. EARLY MARRIAGE IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES........................ 1841
A. Demographics of Today’s Early Marriers ................................ 1841
B. The Costs of Early Marriage ..................................................... 1843
1. Family Instability and Divorce ............................................ 1844
2. Lost Educational Attainment and Future Poverty ............... 1846
3. Effects on Women’s Mental and Physical Health….. ......... 1847
4. Effects on Children’s Developmental Outcomes ................ 1848
III. REGULATORY LAG: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MODERN
ADOLESCENCE AND MODERN MARRIAGE ......................................... 1850
A. Reconceptualizing Marital Capacity ......................................... 1850
1. Capacity to Consent............................................................. 1851
2. Capacity to Sustain .............................................................. 1853
B. The Age-Related Attainment of Marital Capacity ..................... 1854
1. Cognitive Maturity in Adolescence and Capacity to
Consent… ............................................................................ 1855
2. Psychosocial Development, the Prolonged Life Course
to Adulthood, and Incapacity to Sustain Modern
Marriage.. ............................................................................ 1857
C. Correcting Regulatory Lag: Raising the Age of
Presumptive Marital Capacity................................................... 1860
1. Policy Considerations .......................................................... 1861
2. Constitutional Considerations ............................................. 1861
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1862
∗

Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. B.A. Yale College, J.D.
Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Kerry Abrams, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Neal
Devins, James Dwyer, Rebecca Green, Rich Hynes, Timothy Zick, and the participants of
the University of Virginia Faculty Workshop Series for their helpful comments.

1817

1818

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1817

Age at marriage has for decades been the strongest and most unequivocal
predictor of marital failure. The likelihood of divorce nears eighty percent for
those who marry in mid-adolescence, then drops steadily. Delaying marriage
until the mid-twenties reduces one’s likelihood of divorce to thirty percent.
Women who marry at age twenty-one or younger, moreover – and one in ten
U.S. women do – experience worse mental and physical health, attain less
education, and earn lower wages than those who marry later. Post-divorce,
they and their children tend to endure even greater economic deprivation and
instability than do never-married mothers, who will frequently have invested
more in market work and education.
While the social cost of early marriage is significant, U.S. policy disregards
the hundreds of thousands of young people currently married or divorced, as
well as those who may be contemplating early marriage. A comprehensive
analysis of early marriage and its regulation is overdue, and this Article
undertakes that task.
The Article argues that a historic confluence of cultural and structural
changes has simultaneously transformed the social function and meaning of
modern marriage and prolonged the course of development to adulthood. It
advances a new conception of “marital capacity” to supplant the current legal
concept of consent, which is inadequate in the context of marriage. This new
conception recognizes adolescents’ and emerging adults’ cognitive abilities to
understand and voluntarily consent to marriage, but also accounts for their
psychosocial immaturity and incomplete acquisition of other abilities required
to sustain modern marriage.
The median age at first marriage is rising, reflecting gradual social
adaptation to these cultural and structural changes. Legal adaptation,
however, has lagged. Even though law is only one of the structural influences
on family formation, legal change bringing the marital age in line with the
modern social institution will go far to alleviate the strain on individuals and
cost to society imposed by early marriage.
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to enact the International
Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2010.1 The bill aimed

1 International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2010, S. 987, 111th
Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. S8353-55 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2010). The bill never became
law, failing to pass in the House of Representatives. 156 CONG. REC. H8551-52 (daily ed.
Dec. 16, 2010). The House version of the bill had the initial support of 112 co-sponsors, but
opposition arose following last-minute circulation of a memo that erroneously claimed its
passage would authorize U.S.-funded abortions abroad. International Protecting Girls by
Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 2103, 111th Cong. (2009) (listing bill sponsor
and original co-sponsors); Conor Williams, Child Marriage Bill UPDATE, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/12/child_m
arriage_bill_update.html. House members introduced another version of the bill, which was
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“[t]o protect girls in developing countries through the prevention of child
marriage,”2 and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton joined its drafters
in denouncing “‘all cases of child marriage as child abuse.’”3 The bill’s
explicit target was marriage by individuals below a country’s legal minimum
age, but its factual findings all alluded to marriage by girls under eighteen.4
The irony apparently lost on U.S. lawmakers who supported the bill is that
child marriage is not limited to developing countries but is also a domestic
practice; more than one in ten of all U.S. women surveyed between 2001 and
2002 had married before age eighteen, with an estimated 9.4 million having
married at age sixteen or younger.5 In 2010, more than 500,000 U.S. teens
were married, divorced, separated, or widowed.6
What is surely the most familiar statistic of modern American family life –
that nearly half of all marriages end in divorce7 – obscures significant and
consistent variations in marital stability depending on the age at which people
first marry. For decades now, age at marriage has been the most consistent and
referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. International Prevention of Child
Marriage Act of 2010, H.R. 6521, 111th Cong. (2010). As of this writing, no further action
on the reintroduced bill has been reported.
2 S. 987.
3 Id. § 2 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 111-344, at 2 (2010).
4 S. 987 §§ 2-3. The bill declared countries with high rates of marriages by those under
eighteen to be “high-prevalence areas for child marriage” and required the State Department
to provide status reports on the practice of child marriage, presumptively defining “child
marriage” for reporting purposes to mean marriage by individuals under the age of eighteen
if no legal minimum is stipulated by law. Id. § 2.
5 Yann Le Strat, Caroline Dubertet & Bernard Le Foll, Child Marriage in the United
States and Its Association with Mental Health in Women, 128 PEDIATRICS 524, 526 (2011)
(drawing from a sample of over 24,000 American women and concluding that child
marriage increases the risk of lifetime psychological disorders in women). Le Strat and his
colleagues analyzed data drawn from the 2001 to 2002 National Epidemiologic Survey on
Alcohol and Related Conditions (a population-based, national, representative-sample
survey) to evaluate the impact of child marriage on the mental health of women in the
general adult population. Using a sample of more than 24,575 women, the researchers
found that women who married before age eighteen experienced higher rates of both
lifetime and current psychiatric disorders than did women who married as adults. The study
thus concluded that “[c]hild marriage increases the risk of lifetime and current psychiatric
disorders in the United States.” See id. at 524, 528. For a more detailed discussion of the
study’s findings, see infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS OF PEOPLE 15
YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, PERSONAL EARNINGS, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, at Table
A1 (2010) [hereinafter MARITAL STATUS OF PEOPLE 15 YEARS AND OVER], available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html.
7 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 4 (2009) [hereinafter CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND];
National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm.
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unequivocal predictor of marital failure.8 Of marriages entered at age twentyfive or later, fewer than thirty percent end in divorce.9 Of marriages entered
before age eighteen, on the other hand, nearly seventy percent end in divorce.10
The earliest marriers, those adolescents who enter marriage in their mid-teens,
experience marital failure rates closer to a sobering eighty percent.11 Not until
age twenty-two does marital stability improve significantly and do marriage
dissolution rates begin to level off, although marriages entered at later ages are
more stable still. 12
The costs of child marriages (those entered before age eighteen) as well as
early marriages more generally (those entered at age twenty-one or younger)
extend beyond the likelihood of their dissolution. Early marriers are more
likely than those who delay or avoid marriage to discontinue their formal
educations prematurely, earn low wages, and live in poverty.13 Women who
marry early develop more mental health problems and experience worse
physical health than those who marry later.14 Following divorce, mothers (and
their children) tend to suffer greater economic deprivation and instability than
do their never-married counterparts.15
This Article sets out to address early marriage – not only to draw attention
to its costs, but also to explore the social factors that influence age at marriage,
to gain a better understanding of the underlying causes of its historic failure

8

THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2001: THE SOCIAL HEALTH
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 19 (2001); Tim B. Heaton, Factors Contributing to Increasing
Marital Stability in the United States, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 392, 407 (2002); Jeffry H. Larson &
Thomas B. Holman, Premarital Predictors of Marital Quality and Stability, 43 FAM. REL.
228, 230 (1994).
9 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407 fig.2.
10 Id.; see also NAOMI SEILER, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, IS TEEN MARRIAGE A
SOLUTION? 7 fig.5 (2002).
11 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407 fig.2.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 Gordon B. Dahl, Early Teen Marriage and Future Poverty, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 689, 691
(2010); see also Karl L. Alexander & Thomas W. Reilly, Estimating the Effects of Marriage
Timing on Educational Attainment: Some Procedural Issues and Substantive Clarifications,
87 AM. J. SOC. 143, 143-44 (1981); Thomas Ewin Smith & Eugenia Hooker, Sex Differences
in Marriage and Parenthood as Factors Impeding Educational Attainment, 59 SOC. INQUIRY
343, 343 (1989).
14 Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5, at 527-28 (“[C]ontrolling for
sociodemographic characteristics, child marriage was significantly associated with all
lifetime mental disorders except pathological gambling and histrionic and dependent
personality disorders.”).
15 Daniel T. Lichter, Deborah Roempke Graefe & J. Brian Brown, Is Marriage a
Panacea? Union Formation Among Economically Disadvantaged Unwed Mothers, 50 SOC.
PROBS. 60, 75 (2003) (finding that for African American, Hispanic, and White women alike,
“getting married and later divorcing more than doubles the likelihood of poverty”); see also
SEILER, supra note 10, at 8.

OF
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rate, and through this better understanding, to propose legal reform informed
by more than the simple empirical evidence of its failure.
The Article analyzes the legal and social history of marital age and its
regulation, as well as research from social anthropology and the social and
developmental sciences. It argues that a historic confluence of developments
in cultural and structural factors that influence marriage has simultaneously
transformed the social functions and meaning of modern marriage (increasing
the relational capacities required to sustain it) and prolonged the course of
development to adulthood (rendering adolescents and emerging adults – whose
cognitive and psychological development we now know continues into the
early twenties – even less likely to possess those requisite capacities).
To redress the inadequacy of our current legal framework, which conflates
capacity to consent with capacity to perform, this Article advances a new
conception of “marital capacity.” To give legally valid consent, a person must
possess the cognitive abilities to understand the basic nature of the marital
obligation and to voluntarily agree to marry. To sustain the modern marriage,
a person must possess core aspects of psychosocial maturity and other abilities.
The Article discusses research in the developmental sciences demonstrating
that young people have attained the former cognitive abilities by midadolescence (ages fifteen or sixteen), but that they will not attain the latter
psychosocial maturity and other abilities until late adolescence/emerging
adulthood (the early twenties). It argues that “marital capacity” requires the
attainment of both.
The median age at first marriage is rising, reflecting gradual social
adaptation to these cultural and structural changes. Legal adaptation, however,
has lagged. Law is only one of the structural influences on family formation.
A legal structure that better corresponds to the nature and requirements of the
modern social institution can, however, go far to alleviate the strain on
individuals and cost to society imposed by early marriage. Law and legal
institutions create and support civil marriage, using it as a tool to achieve
socially desirable ends.16 State-supported privileges and other benefits linked
to marriage, while difficult to quantify, are vast. Economic benefits alone total
billions of dollars annually in direct federal and state payments, tax benefits,
and workplace-based benefits.17 It is debatable whether marriage in general
produces outcomes that justify the massive public investment in the institution.

16

June Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the
Public/Private Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 269-70 (1996); Vivian Hamilton,
Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 308-09 (2004).
17 Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 141,
166-69 (2003). Bernstein notes that “[t]he United States government subsidizes marriage
through transfer payments and other supports that are not means tested. These payments
constitute a reward that taxpayers as a group bestow on a class of individuals based solely
on these persons’ being . . . married.” Id. at 167-68. Social Security transfer payments and
Medicare benefits are just two examples of subsidies that reward marriage. Id. at 167, 169.
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That early marriage does not is apparent.
This Article thus urges
reconsideration of state policies that give early marriages legal effect.
Part I provides historical, legal, and social context. It begins with the legal
history of marital age regulation, which underscores the once-essential
functions of marriage in society. It describes the current legal landscape,
which has not strayed far from its common law roots. It then examines the
significant and interrelated influence on marriage, and age at marriage, of
changing economic and cultural conditions. It turns to social anthropology for
an integrative account of the evolution of the social functions of marriage and
the meaning of marriage itself. These social changes have rendered marriage
less essential to individuals’ economic survival and social acceptance,
eliminated once-clearly defined spousal roles, making it necessary for
individual couples to negotiate them, and increased individuals’ expectations
of the marital relationship itself.
Part II examines the demographics of modern early marriage and the largely
overlooked yet overwhelming empirical data that reveals its social costs. Laws
universally require parents to consent to the marriages of children younger than
eighteen.18 Parental consent, however, safeguards child marriages against
negative outcomes insufficiently, if at all. The same can be said for delaying
marriage until eighteen, the near-universal age of legal majority.
Improvements in marital stability and outcomes appear only when couples
delay marrying until their early twenties.
Part III argues that the law has failed to keep pace with these significant
social developments. This Article argues that the social changes chronicled in
the previous Parts demonstrate that the psychosocial capacities required to
sustain a modern marriage have changed drastically over the last fifty years,
while the cognitive capacity to understand and voluntarily consent to marry
have remained essentially unchanged for centuries. It argues that the social
and legal factors that once justified early marriage either no longer exist, or are
sufficiently weak as to be outweighed by the state’s obligation to safeguard the
general welfare by – at a minimum – abandoning unreasonable policies
demonstrably in derogation of it. The Article briefly describes relevant aspects
of adolescent cognitive and psychological development, which continues well
into late adolescence and beyond, and the age-related attainment of marital
capacity.19
The Article concludes that states should return the presumptive age of
consent to twenty-one, permit younger individuals to marry with judicial – not
parental – consent, and withhold altogether legal recognition from marriages of
adolescents younger than eighteen.

18

See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts II.B.1-2. See generally JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING
ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES (2004).
19
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AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE IN CONTEXT

This Part explores the influence of social contexts on age at first marriage.
Scholars broadly characterize these contextual influences as structural (e.g.,
legal, economic, and institutional) or cultural (e.g., religious tradition and
social norms).20 Structural influences on family formation can be either
economic (e.g., employment opportunities) or noneconomic (e.g., imbalances
in sex ratios among marriageable individuals and legal requirements).
Although each of these influences is conceptually distinct and affects empirical
trends differently, they interrelate such that their effects on each other and on
trends in family formation can sometimes be difficult to disentangle.21
The legal context, for example, both shapes and reflects cultural norms. The
next Section examines the origins and evolution of the legal regulation of the
marital age. It also discusses legal developments that have indirectly
influenced trends in the age at first marriage. Yet the law has not been the
only, nor likely the primary, contextual factor affecting the median age at
which individuals first marry. Even during periods of no significant legal
change, the median age at marriage has fluctuated. The subsequent Sections
examine non-legal influences on age at first marriage, the most salient of
which have included economic and cultural developments. Understanding
both the legal and the non-legal developments that have shaped large-scale
trends in the age at which individuals marry illuminates the meaning and
function of marriage in society. As its meaning and function have changed,
moreover, so too have the individual characteristics and abilities required to
enter and sustain marriage.
A.

Legal History of Marital Age Regulation

Legal regulation of marriage has increased over the course of centuries,
reflecting marriage’s growing importance as the primary social institution
within the state.22 Marriage regulations have long established the age at which
individuals may marry, although as long as such rules have existed, ineligible
couples wishing to marry have nonetheless managed to skirt them. Laws
regulating the marital age, moreover, have frequently advanced social interests
altogether unrelated to the legal maturity of would-be marriers.23
20

See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century,
15 FUTURE CHILD. 33, 39-40 (2005) [hereinafter Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First
Century] (“Most analysts would agree that both economic and cultural forces have been
driving the changes in American family life over the past half-century. Analysts disagree
about the relative weight of the two, but . . . both have been important.”); Jeremy Elliot
Uecker, Early Marriage in the United States: Why Some Marry Young, Why Many Don’t,
and What Difference It Makes 40 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Texas at Austin) (on file with The University of Texas Libraries’ Digital Repository).
21 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 40.
22 See infra notes 24-28, 43-50 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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The legal origins of U.S. marriage, and the societal interests they aimed to
protect, indelibly shaped U.S. marriage itself and marital age law, which of
course later adapted to the distinctive American milieu.24 Essential aspects of
the historical and legal elements of marital age regulation remain, however. It
is to those aspects that this Article now turns.
1.

Canon Law, Common Law, and Early Statutory Law

Family formation in the Early Modern period was informal, and family
structure fluid.25 Marriage existed, but it did so alongside polygamy,
concubinage, easy divorce, and remarriage.26 Its terms remained relatively
variable and flexible into the Middle Ages, its sole essential characteristic
consisting of a privately negotiated property exchange between two families,
with financial protection for the wife in case of divorce or her spouse’s death.27
Couples with no property married through even simpler private agreements,
which were enforced only informally by their communities.28
Marriage became a more clearly and rigidly defined institution when the
Roman Catholic Church assumed regulation over it in the thirteenth century.
Church canon law rendered marriages indissoluble, prohibited polygamy and
incest, punished fornication and adultery, and declared nonmarital children
illegitimate and ineligible to inherit property.29 In the centuries that followed,
however, the requirements for entering a valid marriage were neither widely
understood by the public nor consistently implemented by the courts.30 The
original canon law recognized the validity of “spousal” or contract marriages
requiring only the present agreement of the couple, and introduced the Roman
age of consent – fourteen for males and twelve for females.31 Together these
doctrines diminished the importance of parental or guardian consent, which
had been an essential aspect not only of medieval secular practice but also

24

Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2004).
LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 30-31
(1977) [hereinafter STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE].
26 Id. at 30.
27 Id. at 30-31.
28 Id. at 31.
29 Id.; see also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 5-6 (2000).
30 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 31-35. Additional formality
requirements included publishing notices (known as “banns”) of the upcoming marriage in
the weeks preceding the ceremony or, in the alternative, purchasing a license to marry. Id.
at 31.
31 T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 31 (1960) (“Depending on
the age of puberty, the age of fourteen for males fixed by Justinian was generally followed
throughout Western Europe, subject of course to the requisite consents by guardians and
parents.”).
25
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basic to the Roman law.32 The weakening of family and parental control over
marriage led the propertied classes to resist these canonical introductions.33
After the Protestant Reformation, marriage regulation came under civil (as
opposed to purely religious) authority,34 but the English Parliament enacted no
statutory changes to then-existing marriage law.35 The post-Reformation
Church, on the other hand, sought greater formalization of couples’ entry into
marriage. It imposed new requirements that mandated public church
ceremonies presided over by clergy and parental consent to the marriages of
persons younger than twenty-one.36 The ecclesiastical courts that retained
jurisdiction over marriage litigation, however, continued to recognize the legal
validity of informal contract marriages that failed to comply with the new
formality requirements.37

32

LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 53-54 (1990)
[hereinafter STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE].
33 Id. at 54.
34 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32; see also John Witte, Jr.,
From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, in THE
FAMILY, RELIGION, AND CULTURE 42-44 (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997).
35 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 56.
36 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33. Under Roman law, the
age of majority had been fourteen for males, and twelve for females. James, supra note 31,
at 23-25. In France, royal edicts quickly addressed the failure of the 1563 Council of Trent
to require parental consent prior to young persons’ marriages, requiring that any man under
age thirty and any woman under age twenty-five obtain parental consent prior to marriage.
STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 80.
37 David Lemmings, Marriage and the Law in the Eighteenth Century: Hardwicke’s
Marriage Act of 1753, 39 HIST. J. 339, 344 (1996). A contract marriage merely required the
oral agreement, expressed in the present tense, by a couple over the age of consent –
fourteen for females, sixteen for males – in the presence of two witnesses. 3 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN
MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 63 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852) (“[Mutual consent] is of the
essence of marriage; it constitutes of itself, and without the addition of any ceremonies, a
perfect marriage according to natural law; according to the canon law previous to the
Council of Trent; [and] perhaps according to the law of England as it stood before the
passage of the first marriage act . . . .” (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter BISHOP 1852];
STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33; STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE,
supra note 32, at 52; see also BISHOP 1852, supra, § 164 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige Ch.
574 (N.Y. Ch. 1841)). While the state might statutorily require compliance with certain
formalities, marriage was believed to exist in a state of nature and thus preceded the state.
Id. § 68. Once a couple agreed to marry, theirs was a “marriage in the sight of God,” even
“in the absence of all civil and religious institutions.” Id. “[T]he law of nature enables all
persons in whom no natural impediment exists, to intermarry by mere words of consent,
whenever they please.” 3 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS § 144b (3d ed., rev. and enlarged,
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859).
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By the seventeenth century, the public – especially the propertied elite – and
clergy both increasingly regarded the church wedding, preceded by either a
series of public announcements known as “banns” or by the procurement of a
marriage license, as essential prerequisites to a valid marriage.38 The civil
common law courts, which decided property claims,39 thus came to require a
public church wedding before assigning full property and inheritance rights,
treating contract marriages as valid but “irregular.”40
Many couples – most notably minors wishing to marry against their parents’
wishes – began paying corrupt clergymen to secretly preside over and register
marriage ceremonies.41 These “clandestine marriages,” despite noncompliance
with formality requirements, were legally valid and binding (likely because
they had been solemnized by church clergy).42 Thus, unlike contract marriages
that had not been solemnized, clandestine marriage conferred full property and
inheritance rights.43
As growing numbers of young people secretly married against their parents’
wishes, parents of the propertied classes, anxious to control and pass on family
property, sought to reassert control over their children’s marriages.44 They
ultimately turned to Parliament to put an end to legal recognition of clandestine
and contract marriages,45 and in 1753 Parliament passed the “‘Act for the
better preventing of clandestine Marriages.’”46 Among the Act’s stated
purposes was the “prevent[ion of] marriages among the children of the social
elite which were not sanctioned by their parents and other relations.”47
38 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 53. At the Council of Trent in 1563, the
post-Reformation Catholic Church added the requirement of the public church ceremony
presided over by a priest. Id. at 55.
39 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32. After the Protestant
Reformation, marriage regulation came under civil (as opposed to purely religious)
authority, although marriage litigation remained within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts. Id. at 32; WITTE, supra note 34, at 42-44.
40 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-34.
41 Id. at 33. Numerous churches and neighborhoods, such as the Fleet in London,
became infamous for their clergymen’s willingness to flout official requirements and
perform marriage ceremonies for pay. Id.
42 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 96.
43 The oddity of recognizing as valid these otherwise-illegal marriages likely reflected
the participation of clergy and the recording of the ceremonies in a registry. Id. at 98;
Lemmings, supra note 37, at 345. The ecclesiastical courts instead focused enforcement and
punishment efforts on clergy who performed the illegal ceremonies. STONE, FAMILY, SEX
AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 32-33; Lemmings, supra note 37, at 344-45.
44 STONE, FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 25, at 35.
45 Id.
46 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 340.
47 Id. at 347. The Act gave parents an effective veto over the marriages of minors, with
fathers’ rights having priority over mothers’. Id. at 348-49. The Act preferred fathers or
testamentary guardians to mothers. Id. And while minors could appeal the veto of a
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Commonly known as Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, the measure stated the basic
elements of English marriage law for nearly a century after its passage.48
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act declared altogether void both contract marriages
and marriages entered by those under twenty-one absent parental consent.49 In
doing so, it represented, according to one historian, “a uniquely authoritarian
assertion of the economic and political interests of parents over their children”
and an “unprecedented enforcement of parental and familial interest.”50
Hardwicke’s Marriage Act reinforced the centrality of marriage as the
institution through which families controlled property and wealth. Inheritance
laws allowed families to enter advantageous alliances through marriages that
would produce heirs to whom family property would predictably devolve.
Because Church law dictated that only legitimate children could inherit,
ensuring the legal validity of marriage was critical. Hardwicke’s Marriage
Act, by rendering altogether void noncompliant marriages and thus potentially
depriving a family of legitimate heirs, could be harsh in its effects.51 The
British Parliament, in the 1820s, sought to ameliorate these harsh effects and
eventually repealed the Act in that same decade.52 The laws of the American
guardian or mother to the Court of Chancery, they could take no appeal from a paternal
veto, though the father’s “refusal be ever so whimsical or selfish.” Id. at 349 (citing 15 THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 59 (London, T.C. Hansard 1813)). Through this
refusal to constrain fathers, the Act recognized the economic interests of the family and
reinforced paternal prerogative to make decisions affecting those interests. Lemmings,
supra note 37, at 345-50.
48 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 123.
49 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 346-48. By either dissenting to the bann or refusing to
consent to the issuance of a license, parents who objected to a match could prevent a minor
child’s marriage. Id. at 340.
50 Id. at 341-42. Hardwicke’s Marriage Act explicitly required parental consent to the
issuance of marriage licenses – but not banns – to minors, a fact to which some
commentators have drawn attention. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age
Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1, 7 (1984). Other commentators have observed that it was
unnecessary for the Act to address banns, given that parental opposition to a bann sufficed
to block the subsequent marriage (putting the community on notice of a potentially improper
union in time to lodge objections was, in large part, the purpose of the publication
requirement). Lemmings, supra note 37, at 342 n.11. In addition, the parental notification
requirement preexisted Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, reflecting concern with underage
marriage, by more than a century.
51 The nullification of a marriage, moreover, impeded the ability of the (now-unchaste)
woman to remarry, threatening her with a life of economic vulnerability.
52 Lemmings, supra note 37, at 360. In 1822, Parliament amended the Act by removing
the provision nullifying the marriages of minors lacking parental consent. The amended law
continued to require minors to swear that they had obtained parental consent and to provide
written evidence of that consent before a license would issue. Although a noncompliant
marriage would not be nullified under the new law, willful perjury or fraud carried severe
penalties. Id. In 1823, Parliament formally repealed the remainder of the Act. Id. It
imposed the additional penalty of forfeiture of material benefits from the marriage on
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colonies and subsequent states never formally adopted Hardwicke’s Marriage
Act and instead tended to incorporate English common law rules that, by
comparison, aimed to facilitate marital validity.53
2.

American Colonies and Early States

The common law exported by Britain to its American colonies shaped early
marriage laws, and the common law’s influence endures today.54 Among the
characteristics of early common law doctrine that persist are the relative ease
with which couples can enter legally valid marriages, the presumption in favor
of a marriage’s validity despite the presence of legal impediments or
noncompliance with formalities, and the delegation of a gatekeeping function
to parents whose children intend to marry despite having yet to attain the
presumptive age of consent.55
American colonial law was an evolving blend of English common law,
statutory rules adopted by colonial assemblies, and domestic common law.56
The colonies all enacted marriage codes that mirrored English law, imposing
similar formality requirements, preventing entry into “clandestine” or
otherwise “unlawful” marriages, and extending to parents (especially fathers)
the right to police their children’s marriages.57 Noncompliance, however, was
minors marrying without the requisite parental consent, but removed nullification
requirements for marriages entered absent full compliance with procedural requirements.
Parliament did, however, require the nullification of marriages entered by couples who had
willfully flouted the formal marriage requirements (i.e., the publication of banns or purchase
of a license, followed by a church marriage). Id. With the exception of the removal of
nullification requirements for marriages entered into without parental consent or with minor
procedural defects (the main purpose of which, according to historian David Lemmings, was
to make divorce less easily available based on these defects), English marriage law into the
late 19th century diverged relatively little from the earlier provisions of Hardwicke’s
Marriage Act. Id.
53 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§
2.1-.4 (2d ed. 1988); Wardle, supra note 50, at 7.
54 The states simply retained much of the preexisting common law after the nation’s
founding. BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, §§ 164, 167; COTT, supra note 29, at 5-6.
55 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 53, §§ 2.1-.4. These early doctrines, however, responded
to social and legal concerns of a historical context dramatically different from our own.
Early parental consent requirements, for example, recognized parents’ historical rights to the
labor and earnings of their children. Perhaps as important, parental consent requirements –
by empowering parents to veto improvident marriages – reflected the importance of forming
family alliances through marital unions in order to expand family wealth, and the
presumption of a marriage’s validity reflected the importance of identifying legitimate heirs
to preserve it. Although parental consent requirements endure, these justifications would
hardly support their continued existence.
56 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1985).
57 Id. at 67. Restating general legal principles as they existed in the nineteenth century,
Joel Prentiss Bishop explained that a valid marriage required:
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common.58 Some couples may have resisted traditional religious and civic
control over matrimony, others may have balked at the administrative costs of
formalization, and still others in more sparsely settled regions may simply have
lacked access to officials authorized to sanction and perform marriage
ceremonies.59 Led by the judiciary, American law responded to noncompliant
marriages, not by strictly enforcing marriage regulations, but instead by
extending legal recognition to all but those marriages marred by the most
egregious impediments.60 In American courts, “contract” or “irregular”
marriage evolved into “common law marriage,” and judges relaxed evidentiary
requirements for demonstrating its existence.61
Every state adopted the English age of legal majority – twenty-one – as the
statutory age of presumptive marital consent, when individuals’ marriages no
longer required parental involvement.62 At the same time, however, most
states failed to explicitly repudiate the English common law ages of
presumptive marital consent – twelve for females and fourteen for males.63 In
the absence of statutory language explicitly expressing legislative intent to
invalidate the common law, state courts consistently upheld the validity of
marriages of individuals under twenty-one who met the common law age of
presumptive consent – irrespective of state statutes that required parental
consent to the marriages of those individuals.64
1. An agreement; 2. according to the forms made necessary by the municipal law; 3.
between a man and woman, both of whom are of sound mind; 4. of the requisite age; 5.
capable of contracting marriage generally; 6. and with each other; 7. and capable of
sexual intercourse. . . . The failure of any one of them makes the marriage invalid.
2 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 43.
58 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 68.
59 Id. at 68-69.
60 Id. at 69-70.
61 Id. at 69-70, 79.
Judges facilitated couples’ efforts to prove their marriages by
“formally receiving into American common law the old rule that marriage could be
presumed from the acknowledgements, cohabitation, and reputation of a couple.” Id. at 79.
Statutorily imposed formality requirements thus became “directory, not mandatory.” Id. at
74.
62 Id. at 106; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt a. (1981); Robert
F. Drinan, American Laws Regulating the Formation of the Marriage Contract, 383
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 50, 55 (1969).
63 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 106.
English common law retained the Roman
minimum age of marital consent. BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 192; Id. § 174 (stating that
“[t]he consent of parents is not, at common law, essential to the validity of the marriages of
minors” (footnotes omitted)). The validity of a marriage required only “‘suitable
contracting parties, and a free consent, to render it valid.’” GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at
103 (quoting FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 15 (1835)).
64 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 106-07, 143. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the
common law had long recognized the validity of informal marriages and held that, “a statute
may take away a common law right; but there is always a presumption that the legislature
has no such intention, unless it be plainly expressed.” Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 79
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Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, reformers began lobbying to raise
the ages of both sexual and marital consent.65 Galvanized by the spread of
venereal disease and a growing prostitution trade that employed young girls,
they launched a broad “social purity movement”66 that advocated not only
“premarital chastity and marital fidelity”67 but more broadly sought to instill “a
more generalized sense of sexual restraint and self-control and stigmatized all
forms of non-marital sexuality.”68 Purity reformers also suggested that the
children of young couples were prone to ill health, and questioned the mental
capacity of young marriers, reasoning that the age of “‘majority’ is the law’s
simple devise for securing mental maturity in the graver affairs of life.”69 Of
the many decisions required of individuals, the reformers argued that marriage
is “as serious a business as making a will or signing a deed.”70
Most states responded by raising statutory ages of sexual and marital
consent, though only modestly.71 The majority of states, whose ages of sexual
consent were between ten and twelve, raised them to somewhere between
thirteen and sixteen,72 and many raised their ages of marital consent to sixteen
for females and eighteen for males.73 The judiciary, however, continued to
consider nonage (that is, failure to reach the legally established minimum age)
a less serious impediment to marriage than other impediments such as bigamy
or incest, which rendered the resulting marriages altogether void.74 Judges
instead treated underage marriages as valid but voidable so long as either party
remained underage, and as fully valid once both parties had reached the legal
age of consent.75
By the end of the twentieth century, a majority of states had adopted statutes
raising the age of marital consent and ending recognition of common law
(1877).
65 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 141 (1985).
66 J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, You Can Steal Her Virginity but Not Her Doll: The Nineteenth
Century Campaign to Raise the Legal Age of Sexual Consent, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
229, 233 (2009).
67 Id. at 230 (quoting ALAN HUNT, GOVERNING MORALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MORAL
REGULATION 77 (1999)).
68 Id. at 229-31.
69 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 141 (citing FRED S. HALL & ELIZABETH W. BROOKE,
AMERICAN MARRIAGE LAWS IN THEIR SOCIAL ASPECTS 18 (1919)).
70 Id.
71 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 141-42; Ehrlich, supra note 66, at 235.
72 Ehrlich, supra note 68, at 235.
73 GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 142.
74 Id. at 142, 144-46; see also 1 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 199. At common law,
however, if either party was below the age of seven, the resulting marriage was altogether
void. Id. § 194.
75 BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 196; see also, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212
S.W.3d 100, 104 (Ky. 2006) (holding that a marriage of thirteen-year-old girl to an adult
man was voidable, not void); BISHOP 1852, supra note 37, § 199.
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marriages, which displaced the common law age of presumptive consent.76
Both common law doctrines, however, have persisted in a minority of states
into the twenty-first century.77 In Colorado, for example, a court adopted the
common law age of sexual consent – twelve for females and fourteen for males
– as the presumptive age of marital consent for common law marriage.78
Although state statute establishes eighteen as the presumptive age of consent
for marriage, permitting individuals as young as sixteen to marry only with
either parental or judicial consent, the court held that “‘[t]he common law of
England . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full
force until repealed by legislative authority.’”79
3.

Modern Regulation

Age twenty-one continued to be the universal age of legal majority and
statutory age of marital capacity until the mid-twentieth century.80 Prompted
by wartime needs, Congress lowered the draft age during World War II from
twenty-one to eighteen.81 Legal restrictions that denied rights to eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds came under scrutiny soon thereafter.82 By the early 1970s,
approximately half of the states had lowered their ages of marital consent to
eighteen.83

76

GROSSBERG, supra note 56, at 101-02.
Id.
78 In re the Marriage of J.M.H., 143 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Colo. App. 2006) (quoting COLO.
REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2012)) (holding that the common law age of consent for marriage
was fourteen for males and twelve for females, and remanding the case to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing on the existence of a common law marriage between a fifteen-yearold girl and her putative common law adult spouse); see also In re Pace, 989 P.2d 297, 298
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that “[t]he common-law ages of consent are 14 for a male and
12 for a female[, and that a] minor who has reached the age of consent does not need the
consent of a parent to enter into a valid common-law marriage”). Kansas later raised the
state minimum age of consent to eighteen by statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101(b) (2007)
(“The state of Kansas shall not recognize a common-law marriage contract if either party to
the marriage contract is under 18 years of age.”).
79 J.M.H., 143 P.3d at 118 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (2012)).
80 WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING AGE
IN AMERICA 72 (1992).
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a, reporter’s note (1981) (“The
impetus for the lowering of the age of majority probably came from the widespread draft of
those under twenty-one and from the lowering of the voting age to eighteen.”).
82 Advocates argued that if eighteen-year-olds were to bear the obligations of adulthood,
in particular wartime military service, they ought also to receive all the legal benefits of
adulthood. CULTICE, supra note 80, at 20-21 (quoting 88 CONG. REC. 8316 (1942)
(statement of Sen. Arthur Vandenberg)).
83 Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act – Marital Age Provisions, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 179, 187 n.42 (1972) (citing statutory provisions of states that had, by 1972, lowered
the marriage age). In 1974 the Twenty-Sixth Amendment made eighteen the national voting
77
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The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), promulgated by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970, captured the national trend.84
The UMDA’s marital age provisions proposed: (1) setting eighteen as the
presumptive age of marital consent; (2) permitting sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds to marry after obtaining either parental or judicial consent; and (3)
permitting those younger than sixteen to marry after obtaining both parental
and judicial consent.85 Judicial consent required a finding (1) that the minor
had the capacity to assume the responsibilities of marriage, and (2) that
marriage was in the minor’s best interest.86 Failure to obtain the requisite
parental and/or judicial consent rendered the resulting union voidable, but not
automatically void.87
The presumptive age of marital consent is now eighteen in all states but two
– Nebraska, where it is nineteen, and Mississippi, where it is seventeen for
males and fifteen for females.88 Every state permits adolescents younger than
eighteen to marry with either parental or judicial consent, with most setting the
minimum marital age at sixteen.89 Nearly forty states permit minors younger
than sixteen to marry with both parental and judicial consent, or in case of
pregnancy or birth of a child.90
Other legal developments have influenced, albeit less directly, age at
marriage. Historically, couples facing unintended nonmarital pregnancy
commonly faced intense pressure to marry in order to avoid the social and
legal stigma that attended nonmarital sex and illegitimate birth. In a series of
cases beginning in the 1960s, however, the U.S. Supreme Court steadily
eroded states’ abilities to criminalize or otherwise burden private, consensual

age. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
84 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973).
85 Id. § 203.
86 Id. § 205.
87 Id. § 208. Minors or their parents could bring suit to have the marriage declared
invalid, but parents retained the right to do so only until the minor reached the age at which
he or she could marry without the required consent. Id.
88 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (2008); see also Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 587 app. D (2005); Pamela E. Beatse, Note, Marital Rights for Teens:
Judicial Intervention That Properly Balances Privacy and Protection, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
625, 628 n.18 (gathering statutes regulating marriage). The Mississippi statute has not been
challenged, although its differential treatment of males and females renders it
constitutionally vulnerable under current equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
89 See generally Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012) (gathering state statutes).
90 Id. (showing the statutes of thirty-seven states contain provisions allowing minors
younger than sixteen to marry with approval or in case of pregnancy or childbirth).
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sexual conduct.91 It also held unconstitutional the once-common impediments
that stigmatized nonmarital children.92
Modern law thus punishes neither nonmarital sex93 nor nonmarital birth, and
premarital sex is nearly universal.94 For adolescents, nonmarital procreation
has become much more common than procreation within marriage: in 2007,
the overwhelming majority of adolescents who gave birth were unmarried –
only seven percent of fifteen-to-seventeen-year-olds and twelve percent of
eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds who gave birth did so within marriages.95
The dismantling of the negative legal consequences of nonmarital sex was
an important structural change that evinced an increasingly tolerant sexual
culture and growing respect for individual liberty. Along with other significant
social changes, it rendered marriage less compulsory and contributed to the
principal development in family formation over the past half-century – the
erosion of marriage as the only acceptable locus for sex and childrearing.96
The Sections that follow identify other significant contextual influences on
family formation and age at marriage, examining first the role of changing
economic opportunities then the cultural developments that have both
fundamentally changed the function and very meaning of marriage in modern
society.
B.

Economic Influences on Age at First Marriage

For Western men, economic independence has long been considered a
prerequisite to marriage.97 Empirical data reveals a consistently inverse
relationship between the availability of economic opportunity for men and age
at first marriage.98 Men have married at younger ages when greater economic
91

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (invalidating state law
requiring a nonmarital child, as a condition of inheriting by intestate succession from a noncustodial biological father, to demonstrate that his or her parents married after the child’s
birth).
93 Explicit legal protection for same-sex intimate conduct is of more recent vintage. See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
94 Heaton, supra note 8, at 406.
95 Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United
States, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nch
s/data/databriefs/db18.pdf.
96 CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra note 7, at 7.
97 STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 54.
98 Valerie Kincaide Oppenheimer, A Theory of Marriage Timing, 94 AM. J. SOC. 563
(1988). Oppenheimer’s theory has since received significant empirical confirmation. See,
e.g., Kim L. Lloyd & Scott J. South, Contextual Influences on Young Men’s Transition to
First Marriage, 74 SOC. FORCES 1097, 1101-02 (1996); Valerie Kincaide Oppenheimer,
Matthijs Kalmijn & Nelson Lim, Men’s Career Development and Marriage Timing During
a Period of Rising Inequality, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 311 (1997); Yu Xie et al., Economic
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opportunities have been available to them; when economic opportunities have
been scarce, men take longer to reach the economic security deemed necessary
to sustain marriage and consequently marry later in life.99
Reliable, specific records documenting age at first marriage exist only as of
the late nineteenth century. Before the nineteenth century, however, the ready
availability of land in the expanding nation meant abundant economic
opportunities for young men.100 Evidence suggests that during this early
period in the nation’s history, men married relatively early, in their twenties.101
Men also outnumbered women, and the sex-ratio imbalance helps explain the
even younger ages at which colonial and early American women apparently
married.102 As the frontier disappeared and land became scarcer, though, it
took young men more time to gain economic security, doing so at later ages.103
They married later, too. The median age at first marriage climbed steadily,
peaking around 1890 at ages twenty-six for men and twenty-two for women.104
The subsequent rise of industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century
again created abundant employment opportunities for young men and offered a
new path to economic security.105 Manufacturing accelerated in the years
during and after World War II, and economic opportunities continued to
expand.106 In the industrialized economy, advanced formal education and the
years required to attain it were unnecessary to obtain well-paid work; only one
out of three adults completed high school, and one out of sixteen graduated
from college.107 The median age of marriage again decreased, falling most
drastically in the economically prosperous period between World War II and
1960, when it reached a low of twenty-two for men and twenty for women.108
Potential and Entry into Marriage and Cohabitation, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 351 (2003).
99 Catherine A. Fitch & Steven Ruggles, Historical Trends in Marriage Formation: The
United States 1950-1990, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND
COHABITATION 59 (Linda J. Waite et al. eds., 2000).
100 Michael R. Haines, Long Term Marriage Patterns in the United States from Colonial
Times to the Present, 14-15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. h0080,
1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=190420.
101 Id.; Uecker, supra note 20, at 8.
102 Haines, supra note 100, at 35-36.
103 Id. at 36.
104 Uecker, supra note 20, at 8; see also Christine Bachrach et al., The Changing Shape
of Ties That Bind, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 99, at 1; Haines, supra note 100, at 27.
105 Haines, supra note 100, at 35-36.
106 Fitch & Ruggles, supra note 99, at 65.
107 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERCENT OF PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND
OVER WHO HAVE COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND
SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940 TO 2002, at Table A-2 (2003), available at www.census.gov/po
pulation/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf.
108 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ESTIMATED MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST
MARRIAGE, BY SEX: 1890 TO THE PRESENT, at Table MS-2 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.xls; see also Fitch & Ruggles,

2012]

AGE OF MARITAL CAPACITY

1835

After 1960, technological advances led to increased automation in
manufacturing, and the demand for blue-collar labor declined.109 Domestic
demand for labor declined further as the lower cost of labor abroad led to the
exporting of manufacturing to other countries.110 As blue-collar laborers no
longer commanded premium wages, more women joined the paid workforce to
help support their families.111 These economically driven changes in the
nature of family work helped mark the decline of the (short-lived) singleearner “‘family wage system’” of the post-War years.112
Women’s participation in the paid labor force began making the economic
opportunities available to them – in addition to those available to men –
relevant factors in marital timing.113 The potential for economic selfsufficiency made marriage less essential to women’s survival.114 Women
began to compete with men for jobs, since work in a service- and informationbased economy was less likely to require physical strength than to require
mental and social skills – aptitudes that did not differ by sex.115
Entry into the better-paying information-based professions for both men and
women has required higher levels, and more years, of education and
training.116 More young people began staying in school into their early and
mid-twenties to complete their educations, and more postponed marriage and
parenthood.117
Influenced in part by these economic changes, the national median marital
age again climbed, and it has done so steadily since 1960.118 Americans are
supra note 99, at 65.
109 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 39.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Oppenheimer, Kalmijn & Lim, supra note 98, at 311; Megan M. Sweeney, Two
Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. SOC.
REV. 132 (2002).
114 See Sweeney, supra note 113, at 132.
115 Dana Vannoy, Social Differentiation, Contemporary Marriage, and Human
Development, 12 J. FAM. ISSUES 251, 261 (1991).
116 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 478 (2000). The U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics predicts that the number of computer specialist occupations, specifically
software engineers, systems analysts, and data analysts, will increase by forty-two percent
between 2006 and 2016, and that nearly all of these will require some form of advanced
degree. See Arlene Dohm & Lynn Shniper, Employment Outlook: 2006-16: Occupational
Employment Projections to 2016, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2007, at 86, 97 tbl.3, 98
(2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/11/art5full.pdf.
117 Arnett, supra note 116, at 478.
118 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 108. The median marriage age reached twenty-two
in 1980 – returning, after nearly a century, to its 1890 mark – and has continued upwards.
Id.
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marrying later in life now than they have at any time in the nation’s history.
Indeed by 2009 the median age at marriage reached a historic high of twentyeight for men and twenty-six for women.119
The industrial and postindustrial economies wrought radical changes in both
the nature of work and the composition of the workforce. Men’s work first
moved outside of the home, shop, or farm and into the factory. Women
followed men into the paid workforce in subsequent decades, although
generally driven less by the carrot of economic prosperity than by the stick of
economic necessity.120 Large-scale changes in the nature of individuals’ work
and participation in the national economic life have interrelated, moreover,
with changes in their home lives – including ongoing evolutions in the nature
of marriage relationships, family functioning more generally, and the role that
marriage itself plays, and is expected to play, in individuals’ lives.
C.

Evolution of the Meaning and Function of Marriage

Cultural factors – social norms, moral values, religious traditions, etc. – are
among those that shape the contexts in which individuals develop preferences
and make life decisions.121 Social anthropologists have long agreed that
marriage as we know it did not evolve as a “natural” or innate human
preference.122 To the contrary, marriage was a social invention that served to
counteract behavior that characterized humans’ evolutionary heritage – the
sexual wandering of males whose reproductive strategy was to maximize their
fertility and impregnate as many women as possible.123 Because of women’s
limited reproductive capacity and their own dependency during the extended
period from childbirth through a child’s infancy and early childhood, men’s
commitment to marriage benefited women and children by requiring men to
support and protect them.124
The precise nature and meaning of marriage, and the functions it performed
in society, however, have evolved. The following Sections trace this
evolution. They demonstrate that over time marriage has become less critical
to individuals and to society, that individuals’ expectations of their marital
relationships are now higher and more difficult to meet, and that norms that
once prevented individuals from exiting marriage are now weaker than they
have been since the Church formalized the institution in the thirteenth century.

119

Id.
Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 39-40.
121 Id. at 40.
122 Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 848, 854 (2004) [hereinafter Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage] (citing
LIONEL TIGER & ROBIN FOX, THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL (1971)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
120
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Essential Functional Institution

After the Church established the contours of legal marriage, the social and
legal institution it defined remained firmly entrenched for centuries.125 From
the colonial era well into the nineteenth century and the period of rising
industrialization, American marriages, once formed, generally conformed to
that institutional structure.126 Marriage was the social institution through
which families protected and passed on family property, the support of girls
and women was transferred from their families of origin to their husbands, and
The
couples produced the offspring who would in turn inherit.127
institutionalized marriage provided clearly defined and fixed marital roles for
husbands and wives.128 The husband was the undisputed head of the
household and its sole legal representative.129 His primary marital role was to
support and supervise his wife and children.130 A wife’s separate legal
personhood disappeared upon marriage, becoming subsumed into that of her
husband through the doctrine of coverture.131 Her primary marital role was to
provide her husband domestic services, maintain the home, and care for the
family’s children.132
Thus institutionalized, this marriage-type clearly defined spouses’ respective
roles and established the hierarchy within families.133 Individuals entering
marriage knew what was expected of them, and what they might reasonably
expect. Divorce was all but unavailable, and even had it been a legally
available option, women’s economic dependence on their husbands and other
social pressures would have rendered it unfeasible, at least for most women.
That institutional marriages endured until the death of one of the spouses
provides us little or no information about the quality of couples’
relationships.134 Marital stability did not depend on relationship quality.
Instead, powerful legal and cultural norms – the “forces of law, tradition, and
religious belief,”135 along with support provided by kinship networks, worked
in concert to hold institutional marriages together.136

125

See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Hamilton, supra note 24, at 49.
Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851-52.
127 COTT, supra note 29, at 6-7.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 7.
130 Id.
131 Id. (describing the doctrine of coverture as a complete transfer of the wife’s civic
personhood to the husband).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 258.
135 Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at 40.
136 Id.; Vannoy, supra note 115, at 258.
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The Rise of Companionship

The rising industrial economy that drew men into wage labor and paid them
a wage sufficient to support a family produced the “single-earner,
breadwinner-homemaker marriage,” which reached its heyday in the 1950s.137
Income earning shifted from the joint family work of home and agricultural
production to the husband’s laboring outside the home for wages. Spouses’
roles within marriages involved a clear and complementary division of
labor.138 Marital success entailed each spouse’s performance of his or her
defined role, and spouses derived marital satisfaction from capably performing
their respective roles (breadwinner, homemaker, parents) well.139
A clear division of labor was only one of the characteristics of this marriagetype. Perhaps because labor opportunities frequently required families to move
to urban communities and thus weakened close-by kinship networks, or
perhaps because the home was no longer the primary site of round-the-clock
production and labor, husbands and wives increasingly encountered the need
and opportunities for togetherness and emotional connection.140 They began
expecting to be each other’s companions to an extent not contemplated by
institutional marriage.141 The growing importance of emotional connection,
friendship, and romantic love to perceived marital success led scholars to label
this emerging form of marriage “companionate marriage.”142
While the emphasis on the companionate aspects of marriage continued to
intensify over time, other characteristics and functions of institutional marriage
endured relatively unchanged well into midcentury.143 Marriage itself
remained the only acceptable context for sex, procreation, and family life more
generally.144 Nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing continued to be
137 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851.
This
“traditional” marriage-type, however, was actually a short-lived mid-twentieth century
aberration shaped by the confluence of a rising industrial economy and a post-War
sociopolitical and economic context; at no other time in the nation’s history have families
lived comfortably on the market wages of only one spouse, conceived and raised as many
children to adulthood, or married as young. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra
note 7, at 6 (“We sometimes think of the 1950s as the era of the traditional family, perhaps
because that’s as far back as our collective memory now reaches. But in truth it was the
most unusual time for family life in the past century.”).
138 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 252.
139 Id.; see also Cherlin, Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, supra note 20, at
40.
140 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 256.
141 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851.
142 Sociologist Ernest Burgess coined the term in the mid-twentieth century. See ERNEST
W. BURGESS & HARVEY J. LOCKE, THE FAMILY: FROM INSTITUTION TO COMPANIONSHIP
(1945).
143 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851.
144 Id. at 852. Historian Stephanie Coontz noted that even entering the 1960s, “nothing
seemed more obvious . . . than the preeminence of marriage in people’s lives and the
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relatively rare and were generally confined to socioeconomically
disadvantaged members of society.145
By midcentury, however, a number of social developments converged,
eventually contributing to marriage’s becoming less essential to individuals’
economic survival and social acceptability, and spousal roles becoming less
clearly defined.146 By the late twentieth century, these changes had helped to
fundamentally transform the nature and meaning of the marital relationship
itself.147
3.

Negotiated Spousal Roles

The late 1950s and 1960s were a time of political and cultural ferment.
Dissident political movements (for example, the antiwar movement, the New
Left, and the black, gay, and women’s rights movements) and the civil
disobedience they utilized fed cultural disobedience, one of whose tenets was
defiance of sexual norms.148 The birth control pill became widely available,
enabling couples to separate sex from pregnancy and marriage.149 Nonmarital
sex and cohabitation became more common and less stigmatized.150
The definition of, and expectations for, marriage continued to evolve into
the latter decades of the twentieth century. The well-defined boundaries of
spousal roles blurred.151 In a growing number of marriages, both the husband
and the wife worked outside the home.152 Women continued to shoulder a
disproportionate share of the housework and child care that had once been the
near-exclusive purview of wives, but their husbands’ contributions increased
steadily.153 Couples’ roles within the dual-earner household became more
negotiable, flexible, and egalitarian.154
Women’s entry into and increasing equality within the workforce has meant
that marriage no longer functions as the sole path to their economic survival.
Dual-earner couples have had to renegotiate the once-clearly defined gender
roles that made domestic duties solely the responsibility of wives. The norms

permanence of the male breadwinner family.” STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY:
FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 243 (2005).
145 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64; Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage,
supra note 122, at 852.
146
COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64. But see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
147 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 263-64.
148 Id. at 263; COTT, supra note 29, at 201.
149 COTT, supra note 29, at 202.
150 Id.
151 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 851-52.
152 COTT, supra note 29, at 204.
153 Id. at 205.
154 See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 11 (1989); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 16 (1999).
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that defined for individuals their roles within marriage blurred, then all but
disappeared, making the roles of husbands and wives flexible and negotiable.
Marriage gradually lost its instrumental value as the sole socially acceptable
path to intimate relationship, economic security, and family life.155
Research suggests that expectations of women and men for role sharing and
equality within contemporary marriages heightened the level of tension within
marriages.156 Spouses’ expectations of their marital relationships and their
companions grew. The performance of pre-defined gendered spousal roles
(provider, homemaker) no longer sufficed to define a satisfactory or goodenough marriage.157 Spouses might be dutiful homemakers and providers, but
they nonetheless began viewing the concept of marriage as fundamentally
flawed if it no longer met their desire for love and intimacy. The measure of
marital satisfaction thus shifted “from [the spousal] role to self” and selffulfillment.158
The progressive destigmatizing and greater availability of divorce began to
make exit from unhappy marriages easier.159 It thus largely came to be that
neither social nor economic necessity compelled individuals to enter or remain
in marriages.160 The companionate yet essentially role-based marriages of the
early and mid-twentieth century thus evolved into what sociologists have
termed the modern “individualized marriage.”161
Marriage is no longer essential to social acceptance or economic survival
and has thus lost some of its instrumental value.162 It nonetheless remains
central to the self-identities of many individuals, for whom it largely retains its
symbolic and personal value.163 If anything, these have increased as couples
embrace individualized marriage as the cultural standard.164
155

See Vivian Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
1, 8-9 (2007); Wendy D. Manning et al., The Changing Institution of Marriage:
Adolescents’ Expectations to Cohabit and to Marry, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 559, 560
(2007).
156 Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, Changes in Gender Role Attitudes and Perceived
Marital Quality, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 58, 65 (1995).
157 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 853.
158 FRANCESCA M. CANCIAN, LOVE IN AMERICA: GENDER AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT 11
(1987).
159 Paul R. Amato, Transformative Processes in Marriage: Some Thoughts from a
Sociologist, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 305, 309 (2007) (observing that spouses in modern
marriages expect the marital relationship to fulfill their needs for personal growth and selfactualization, and that “[i]f the marital relationship no longer meets these needs, then
spouses feel justified in jettisoning the relationship to seek out new partners who better meet
these needs”).
160 COONTZ, supra note 144, at 247.
161 Cherlin, Deinstitutionalization of Marriage, supra note 122, at 852.
162 Id. at 854.
163 Id. at 855-57.
164 Id. at 855.
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Modern individualized marriage nonetheless challenges marital stability and
success by normalizing expectations for marital relationships that are difficult
to meet and sustain over time. The following Part gathers empirical evidence
of some of the significant effects these new challenges have on modern
marriage, and also of the factors associated with couples’ differing abilities to
withstand these challenges.
II.

EARLY MARRIAGE IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES

Despite the historical shift toward delayed marriage, 2010 U.S. census data
reported 520,000 married or previously married adolescents aged fifteen to
nineteen,165 and more than twenty-five percent of women and fifteen percent of
men will marry before age twenty-three.166 Early marriers contravene the
strong national trends toward delayed marriage and increased cohabitation.
This Part surveys research that identifies characteristics of earlier marriers and
the nature and outcomes of their marriages. This research makes evident the
high costs of early marriage, to both individuals and broader society.
A.

Demographics of Today’s Early Marriers

A number of structural and cultural factors correlate with demographic
differences in age at marriage.167 Having parents with low socioeconomic
status and educational attainment predicts early marriage; nearly thirty percent
of women without a college-educated parent marry early, as opposed to sixteen
percent of women with a college-educated parent.168 The children of early
marriers are also more likely to enter early marriages themselves.169
Researchers have posited that these young people may be less likely to receive
economic support from their parents, to attend college themselves, and to
perceive attractive options outside of marriage.170 Researchers have found the
highest concentration of early marriers among the relatively poorer and more
religious residents of Southern and nonmetropolitan regions of the country.171
In Red Families v. Blue Families, law and family scholars Naomi Cahn and
June Carbone analyzed empirical research on families across the nation and
found the highest rates of marriage overall and younger ages of entry into
marriage in states whose citizens tend towards social conservatism and greater
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U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6.
Uecker, supra note 20, at 38.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 30.
169 Id. at 37.
170 Id. at 18 (citing Diane K. McLaughlin et al., Some Women Marry Young: Transitions
to First Marriage in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
827, 827-838 (1993)).
171 McLaughlin et al., supra note 170, at 827. Thirty-seven percent of women living in
the rural South marry before age twenty-three. Id.
166
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religiosity.172 Level of religious commitment as well as one’s specific
religious tradition both influence marriage timing.173 Judeo-Christian religious
denominations in general support marriage and marital childbearing, while
discouraging nonmarital sexuality.174 Denominations differ, however, in the
emphasis they place on marriage and familism generally. Conservative
Protestants and Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) embrace a theology that views
marriage as sacred and essential to spiritual salvation.175 Many evangelical
denominations, in addition to adopting a strong pro-marriage orientation,
actively discourage premarital sex and cohabitation.176 These denominations
also embrace traditional gender roles, encouraging women to invest time and
labor in their families within the context of marriage, deemphasizing or
discouraging their labor force participation, and advocating deference to male
authority within the home.177 When combined with strong pro-natalist
orientations, these teachings incline young women towards marriage,
childbearing, and domestic pursuits rather than education and workforce
participation.178
More than forty-two percent of women raised as conservative Protestants
married early, closely followed by Mormon women.179 Along with committed
adherents of other religious traditions, members of these religious groups
marry earlier than mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and the religiously
unaffiliated.180 Adolescents who attend school with higher proportions of

172

NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 2-3, 118-19 (2010) (discussing the
opposition of conservative and religious parents to making the morning-after pill available
to those younger than eighteen, and concluding that “[r]ed families would accordingly like
to reinforce parental control over wayward teens and make it harder to escape the
consequences of improvident conduct”).
173 Religious traditions place different types of emphasis on familism, which, according
to some scholars, influences adherents’ marriage patterns. Xiaohe Xu, Clark D. Hudspeth &
John P. Bartkowski, The Timing of First Marriage: Are There Religious Variations?, 26 J.
FAM. ISSUES 584 (2005) (exploring the correlation between religion and marriage timing and
considering the role of familism – a cultural tendency to focus on the family more than the
individual). Conservative Protestants and Mormons are the most likely to marry early. Id.
at 588.
174 Id. at 589; see also MARK D. REGNERUS, FORBIDDEN FRUIT: SEX & RELIGION IN THE
LIVES OF AMERICAN TEENAGERS 21 (2007).
175 MARK D. REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARITAL SEX IN AMERICA 176 (2011);
Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 590.
176 Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 590.
177 Id. at 594.
178 Id.
179 Uecker, supra note 20, at 32.
180 Id. at 609-10; Xu, Hudspeth & Bartkowski, supra note 173, at 607-08. Although
Catholicism has historically included a strong pro-marriage orientation, recent studies
suggest that the Church’s influence over American Catholics’ decisions about sex, marriage,
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religiously conservative peers, irrespective of their individual religious
characteristics, are also more likely to marry early.181
Early marriage also varies by race and sex.182 White and Latina women are
the most likely to marry early, and nearly thirty percent marry before age
twenty-three.183 Among men, Latinos marry early at the highest rates, with
nearly twenty-five percent married before twenty-three, followed by White
men at sixteen percent.184 African American women and men both were the
least likely to marry early (almost certainly due to the lower marriage rates
overall among African Americans), with eleven percent of women and nine
percent of men marrying before twenty-three.185
B.

The Costs of Early Marriage

Married individuals generally have greater financial, social, and
psychological resources than the unmarried.186 They experience lower rates of
chronic illness and physical limitation, and enjoy greater longevity.187
Husbands tend to derive greater overall health benefits from marriage than do
their wives, and at least some measure of the benefits that women derive stems
from structural gender inequities.188 In other words, the health of married
women “improves because they are married to health insurance: their lowerpaying jobs, and their inferior access to employment-based medical insurance,
keep them away from the health care resources given more generously to
working men.”189 Researchers have found some evidence of a selection effect,
and procreation has waned. Id. at 590 (citing studies).
181 Uecker, supra note 20, at 81 tbl.3.4, 82.
182 Id. at 32.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Matthew E. Dupre & Sarah O. Meadows, Disaggregating the Effects of Marital
Trajectories on Health, 28 J. FAM. ISSUES 623, 625 (2007); Mary Rogers Gillmore et al.,
Marriage Following Adolescent Parenthood: Relationship to Adult Well-Being, 70 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1136, 1136 (2008) (gathering studies).
187 LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED
PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 47-52 (2000); Terrance J.
Wade & David J. Pevalin, Marital Transitions and Mental Health, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 155 (2004); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1995).
188 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 178-80; Kristi Williams, Has the Future of Marriage
Arrived? A Contemporary Examination of Gender, Marriage, and Psychological WellBeing, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 470, 471 (2003); Kristi Williams & Debra Umberson,
Marital Status, Marital Transitions, and Health: A Gendered Life Course Perspective, 45 J.
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 81, 83 (2004). See generally Adrianne Frech & Kristi Williams,
Depression and the Psychological Benefits of Entering Marriage, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 149, 150 (2007).
189 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 179-80; see also Janet Wilmoth & Gregor Koso, Does
Marital History Matter? Marital Status and Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults,
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suggesting that marriage alone cannot account for the greater well-being of
married individuals; instead, individuals with greater well-being before
marriage are more likely to attract marriage partners and sustain marriages.190
A large and growing body of research identifies social costs associated with
early marriage,191 while there is little evidence of offsetting benefits.192 For
individuals to benefit from marriage, moreover, their marriages must remain
intact. Early marriages, however, are unlikely to do so.193 The following
Sections examine the costs of early marriages.
1.

Family Instability and Divorce

For decades, age at marriage has been the most consistent and unequivocal
predictor of marital failure.194 In fact, “age at marriage is one of the strongest

64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 254, 257 (2002).
190 See, e.g., Arne Mastekaasa, Marriage and Psychological Well-Being: Some Evidence
on Selection into Marriage, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 901 (1992); Alois Stutzer & Bruno S.
Frey, Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do Happy People Get Married?, 35 J. SOCIOECON. 326 (2006) (finding that part of the association between marriage and mental health is
due to selection, as those with better mental health are also more likely to marry). But cf.
Kathleen A. Lamb, Gary R. Lee, & Alfred DeMaris, Union Formation and Depression:
Selection and Relationship Effects, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 953 (2003) (finding no evidence
of a selection effect with respect to depression, education, employment, income, or physical
disability).
191 See infra Parts II.B.1-4. Research to date generally supports the conclusion that
marrying “early can lead to added stress and disadvantage, and ultimately poor health,
because important socioeconomic resources may be forfeited (e.g., education).” Dupre &
Meadows, supra note 186, at 626.
192 See, e.g., SEILER, supra note 10, at 8 (stating, in an article published in 2002, that an
analysis of the economic effects of marriage focusing “exclusively on teens is not
available”). One recent longitudinal study compared pregnant seventeen-year-olds who
married at any point within the sixteen years following their pregnancies (most of those who
married, however, did not marry the fathers of their babies – fewer than fourteen percent
ever did) with others who never married, and the average age of those who married was
twenty-three. Gillmore et al., supra note 186, at 1140-42. The study found that marriage
conferred small but statistically significant benefits with respect to economic status and
lower marijuana and polydrug use. Id. Marriage did not, however, improve the economic
status of the very poor, nor did it affect psychological well-being, high school completion,
or the use of other drugs or alcohol. Id.
193 See infra Part II.B.1.
194 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 172, at 55; THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note
8, at 19; Allan Booth & John N. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability, 47 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 67, 68, 71 (1985); Heaton, supra note 8, at 407; Larson & Holman,
supra note 8, at 230. Historian Lawrence Stone noted that cultural trends throughout the
Western world contributed to the rise of twentieth-century divorce rates. He observed that
“[a] significant decline in the age of marriage was also a factor in the 1960s, since teenage
marriages were almost twice as likely to break up as those contracted at a later age.” STONE,
ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 32, at 403.
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and most consistent predictors of marital stability ever found by social science
research.”195 Marriages in general have mediocre chances of enduring –
altogether, about half of all marriages will end in divorce.196 Early marriages,
however, are significantly more likely to fail than are marriages entered later.
Of marriages entered at age twenty-five or later, fewer than thirty percent end
in divorce.197 Of marriages entered before age eighteen, on the other hand,
nearly seventy percent end in divorce.198 The earliest marriers, those
adolescents who enter marriage in their mid-teens, experience marital failure
rates closer to a sobering eighty percent.199 Not until age twenty-two does
marital stability improve significantly and do marriage dissolution rates begin
to level off, although marriages entered at later ages are more stable still.200
Delaying marriage by even a single year significantly reduces the odds of
dissolution.
A closer examination of the divorce rate over the last several decades
reveals the significance of age at marriage on marital stability: The divorce rate
increased through the 1970s until 1980, leveled off for a couple of years, and
has since declined modestly.201 Over the same period, the median age at
marriage steadily increased.202 If it had not, the divorce rate would have
increased rather than decreased.203 In other words, “[a]ll of the decline in
dissolution can be accounted for by the rising age at marriage.”204
If divorce left family members more or less in the same position they would
have been in had the couple never married, the high dissolution rate of early
marriage might cause less consternation. Mental health studies have shown,
however, that the negative psychological effects of divorce are greater than the

195

THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 8, at 19; Warren Clark & Susan
Crompton, Till Death Do Us Part? The Risk of First and Second Marriage Dissolution, 11
CAN. SOC. TRENDS 24, 25 (2006).
196 National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, supra note 7; see also CHERLIN, THE
MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND, supra note 7, at 2.
197 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407.
198 SEILER, supra note 10, at 7.
199 Id.; Heaton, supra note 8, at 407.
200 Heaton, supra note 8, at 407. While age at marriage correlates with marital instability
for both White and African American women, there is evidence that the correlation is
stronger for White women. For White women, marrying during adolescence results in a
fifty-five percent higher risk of marital disruption than does marrying between the ages of
twenty-three and twenty-nine; for African American women, the risk of disruption is forty
percent higher than marrying between twenty-three and twenty-nine. Megan M. Sweeney &
Julie A. Phillips, Understanding Racial Differences in Marital Disruption: Recent Trends
and Explanations, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 639, 644-45 (2004).
201 Heaton, supra note 8, at 398.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 401.
204 Id.

1846

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1817

positive effects of entering marriage.205 For unwed mothers who marry then
divorce, moreover, the risk of poverty is higher than it is for their counterparts
who never marry.206
2.

Lost Educational Attainment and Future Poverty

Teen marriage and lower educational attainment correlate. Women who
marry before age nineteen are fifty percent more likely to drop out of high
school than are their unmarried counterparts, and four times less likely to
complete college.207 And the correlation between educational attainment and
income is so robust and unambiguous that it hardly bears repeating.208
Teen mothers who married between conception and childbirth were less
likely to ever return to school than teen mothers who did not marry.209 Teen
mothers who marry are more likely to have a rapid second birth than are teen
mothers who do not marry; they are also likely to have more children
overall.210 Unsurprisingly, both closely-spaced births and having two or more
children are associated with lower educational attainment.211
Higher educational attainment, moreover, seems to have a protective effect
against marital instability, and that protective effect has grown significantly in
recent decades. Among whites, having at least sixteen years of education
(compared to having less than twelve years) reduced the odds of marital
disruption by thirty-nine percent between 1990 and 1994, compared with an
eight percent reduction between 1970 and 1979.212 The protective effect of
higher education is even greater for African Americans, for whom having
sixteen or more years of schooling was associated with a seventy-five percent
reduction in the odds of disruption between 1990 and 1994, versus nineteen
percent between 1970 and 1979.213
205

Williams & Umberson, supra note 188, at 93-94; Zheng Wu & Randy Hart, The
Effects of Nonmarital Union Transition on Health, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 420 (2002).
206 SEILER, supra note 10, at 8.
207 Dahl, supra note 13, at 691; Daniel Klepinger et al., How Does Adolescent Fertility
Affect the Human Capital and Wages of Young Women, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 421, 443
(1999). See generally David C. Ribar, Teenage Fertility and High School Completion, 76
REV. ECON. & STAT. 413 (1994) (examining the impact of teen childbearing on high school
completion rates).
208 See, e.g., Lichter, Graefe & Brown, supra note 15, at 73.
209 SEILER, supra note 10, at 8-9 (citing Steven D. McLaughlin et al., The Effects of the
Sequencing of Marriage and First Birth During Adolescence, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12, 14
tbls.1 & 2 (1986)).
210 Id. at 8; Deborah Kalmuss & Pearila Brickner Namerow, Subsequent Childbearing
Among Teenage Mothers: The Determinants of a Closely Spaced Second Birth, 26 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 149, 151 (1994).
211 Dianne Scott-Jones, Educational Levels of Adolescent Childbearers at First and
Second Births, 99 AM. J. EDUC. 461, 468 tbl.2 (1991).
212 Sweeney & Phillips, supra note 200, at 645.
213 Id.
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Early marriage also correlates with future poverty. Researchers have only
recently begun to study causality in the context of teen marriage. Economist
Gordon Dahl studied more than 140,000 early adolescent marriages (those
involving women who were younger than sixteen when they married), finding
that early marriages have had a strong negative effect on future poverty, and
that this effect is not due to self-selection.214 Women who married young were
significantly – thirty-one percentage points – more likely to live in poverty
later in life than were women who delayed marriage.215 The negative effect of
early marriage is stronger even than the sizable negative effect of failing to
complete high school; women who dropped out of school were eleven
percentage points more likely to be poor when older.216
3.

Effects on Women’s Mental and Physical Health

In 2011, researchers published the results of the first national study of the
effect of child marriage (before age eighteen) on adult mental health.217 The
study found U.S. child marriages linked to a range of psychiatric disorders –
indeed, “child marriage was significantly associated with all lifetime mental
disorders except pathological gambling and histrionic and dependent
personality disorders.”218 The most prevalent disorders were major depressive
disorder, nicotine dependence, and specific phobias, but the researchers found
the strongest association with antisocial personality disorder – the risk for
women who married as children was nearly three times as high as that of adult
marriers.219
In another analysis of the association between relationship status and mental
health of young adults, the group that reported the highest depressive
symptoms comprised those who married at age eighteen or younger.220 The
age group with the lowest levels of depressive symptoms comprised those who
first married at age twenty-two or older.221
214

Dahl, supra note 13, at 714.
Id. at 691, 705-06.
216 Id. at 705-06.
217 Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5.
218 Id. at 528.
219 Id. at 527. Other researchers have found maternal depression to be greater for women
with younger age at first birth, falling to its lowest levels for women who first give birth
around age thirty and correlating with later age of first marriage, higher educational
attainment, and greater job security. John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Depression,
Parenthood, and Age at First Birth, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1281 (2002).
220 Uecker, supra note 20, at 170-71, 170 tbl.5.2.
221 Id. at 169-71. Those who were engaged to be married reported levels of depressive
symptoms comparable to those who first married at age twenty-two or older. Id. More
young adults who have ever been married, however, report that they are very satisfied with
their lives than do those who have never been married. Nearly thirty-six percent of young
adults in a dating relationship but never married report high overall life satisfaction,
compared with nearly forty-eight percent of those who have ever been married. Levels of
215
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Researchers have also found adolescent marriage correlated with worsened
physical health for women.222 Women who married at age eighteen or younger
had a twenty-three percent greater risk of disease onset, including heart attack,
diabetes, cancer, and stroke.223 The study’s authors found the negative impact
of early marriage on women’s health unsurprising, “given that these females
may forfeit important health resources and often face a greater likelihood of
divorce.”224 The study found no evidence that early marriage worsened the
physical health of men who married early.225
Research uncovered no studies comparing the rates or types of intimate
violence experienced by young married and unmarried women. The U.S.
Department of Justice has reported, however, that women aged sixteen to
twenty-four experience the highest rates of violence at the hands of their
intimate partners, including assaults, rape, robbery, and murder.226 This data
raises concerns that when women in this age group marry, it becomes more
difficult for them to exit violent relationships.
4.

Effects on Children’s Developmental Outcomes

Numerous studies have compared the developmental outcomes of children
born to young mothers and those born to adult mothers.227 Nearly half of all

life satisfaction among married young adults vary significantly by age of marriage,
however: of those first married at eighteen or younger, nearly forty-one percent report high
life satisfaction, compared to more than fifty-five percent of those first married at age
twenty-two or older. Id.
222 Dupre & Meadows, supra note 186.
223 Id. at 636.
224 Id. Dupre and Meadows also posited that females marrying early may be more likely
to have psychological disorders that predispose them to illness. Id. The Le Strat, Dubertet
& Le Foll study sought to more precisely isolate the effect of child marriage on the
development of mental disorders by including in their analyses only those psychiatric
disorders with an age at onset later than the age at first marriage. Le Strat, Dubertet & Le
Foll, supra note 5, at 527.
225 Dupre & Meadows, supra note 186, at 644.
226 LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES:
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND
GIRLFRIENDS 11 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vi.pdf.
227 See, e.g., TERENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., GANGS AND DELINQUENCY IN
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE (2003); Nan Marie Astone, Are Adolescent Mothers Just
Single Mothers?, 3 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 353 (1993); Rebekah L. Coley & P. Lindsay
Chase-Lansdale, Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenthood: Recent Evidence and Future
Directions, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 152 (1998); Ariline T. Geronimus, Damned If You Do:
Culture, Identity, Privilege, and Teenage Childbearing in the United States, 57 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 881 (2003); Greg Pogarsky et al., Developmental Outcomes for Children of Young
Mothers, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 332 (2006); Greg Pogarsky, Alan J. Lizotte & Terence P.
Thornberry, The Delinquency of Children Born to Young Mothers: Results from the
Rochester Youth Development Study, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 101 (2003).
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women who married before eighteen were also likely to be pregnant (fortyeight percent, compared to three percent of women who married as adults).228
Research has consistently shown that the children of mothers who begin
childbearing at a young age have increased risks of various adverse outcomes.
The elevated risks extend to children born later in the mother’s life,229 and
include behavior problems and educational underachievement.230 The risk of
adverse outcomes for the children of young mothers continues into adulthood,
and includes a greater likelihood of poverty,231 unemployment,232 and
becoming young parents themselves.233
Researchers posit that factors tending to coexist alongside early parenthood
contribute to adverse outcomes for children.234 For example, “women who
initiate childbearing at young ages are more likely to experience disorder in the
process of family formation, . . . [and] the stress associated with structural
disadvantage and family disruption increases the likelihood of the mother’s
own antisocial behavior, especially drug use.”235 Conversely, as Professors
Cahn and Carbone have observed, older parents tend to bring greater resources
– financial and emotional – to childrearing. They point out that, in addition to
generally being wealthier, “[p]arents in their late 20s are better educated,
psychologically more mature, and more likely to interact with and stimulate
young children than are younger parents.”236
Studies of the developmental outcomes of children born to young mothers
have not, however, isolated the mothers’ marital status. It is thus possible that
children of young married mothers fare better than those raised by unmarried
young mothers. An intact marital family may conceivably insulate children of
young mothers from experiencing the effects of the various risk factors
associated with early childbearing.
At the same time, however, early marriers tend to endure many of the same
life experiences associated with adverse outcomes for children: They are less
likely to complete high school and attain the social and human capital needed
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Le Strat, Dubertet & Le Foll, supra note 5, at 526.
Pogarsky et al., supra note 227, at 333.
230 Coley & Chase-Lansdale, supra note 227, at 158; Lauren S. Wakschlag et al.,
Maternal Age at First Birth and Boys’ Risk for Conduct Disorder, 10 J. RES. ON
ADOLESCENCE, 417, 432-33 (2000).
231 Sara Jaffee et al., Why Are Children Born to Teen Mothers at Risk for Adverse
Outcomes in Young Adulthood? Results from a 20-year Longitudinal Study, 13 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 377, 391 (2001).
232 Id. at 389.
233 J.B. Hardy et al., Like Mother, Like Child: Intergenerational Patterns of Age at First
Birth and Associations with Childhood and Adolescent Characteristics and Adult Outcomes
in the Second Generation, 34 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1220, 1229 (1998).
234 Pogarsky et al., supra note 227, at 333.
235 Id.
236 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 172, at 55 (citations omitted).
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for financial security, they experience higher levels of family dissolution, and
they tend to exhibit ineffective parenting styles. All of these factors – reduced
parental educational attainment,237 economic disadvantage,238 family
disruption (including changes in parent figures and caregivers),239 and poor
parenting styles240 – likely increase the risk of negative outcomes for children
of young mothers, married and unmarried alike.
III. REGULATORY LAG: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MODERN ADOLESCENCE
AND MODERN MARRIAGE
That the median age at first marriage is higher now than at any other time in
the nation’s history reflects ongoing adaptation to changing social contexts.
Some young people nonetheless want to marry, will obtain (if they are under
the age of presumptive consent) their parents’ or judicial consent, and will
marry with predictably poor results.
The empirical evidence of the costs of early marriages alone should prompt
rethinking of current policy extending them civil and legal recognition. Yet
the law recognizes adolescents’ decisionmaking competence in other arguably
analogous contexts, such as abortion.241 Denying young individuals the ability
to marry based solely on the empirical evidence is arguably justified; it would
fail, however, to provide a principled justification for the different treatment of
young people in the marital than in analogous decisionmaking contexts.
This Part argues that marital capacity is different: sustaining the modern
marriage requires not only the decisional capacity required for valid legal
consent, but also a variety of psychosocial and other adult-level capacities that
young people will not have reliably acquired until their early twenties. Thus, a
principled distinction does exist between adolescents’ marital capacity and
other decisionmaking capacities. This Part argues that adolescents and
emerging adults lack the former, even while they may possess the latter.
A.

Reconceptualizing Marital Capacity

Marriage law has essentially adopted from the law of contract the concept of
legal consent. For a valid contract, an individual must have the capacity to
understand the nature of an agreement and to enter it willingly. That the
individual is unlikely to successfully perform the contract will not invalidate it.

237

THORNBERRY ET AL., supra note 227, at 65.
Id.
239 Astone, supra note 227; Rand D. Conger et al., A Family Process Model of Economic
Hardship and Adjustment of Early Adolescent Boys, 63 CHILD DEV. 526, 537 (1992).
240 Rolf Loeber & Maga Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, 7 CRIME & JUST. 29 (1986).
241 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (extending to minors the right to
terminate a pregnancy but upholding parental consent laws with the provision that a judicial
bypass procedure be available).
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This Part argues that, in light of the evidence of the previous Parts, and in
light of what is known about adolescent cognitive development (relevant
aspects of which are summarized below), adolescents and emerging adults
have the cognitive capacity to give what currently amounts to legally valid
consent to marriage, but they lack the psychosocial capacity to “perform” the
contract. This Part further argues that both of these are required for “marital
capacity,” and thus both ought to be required for a valid marriage.
1.

Capacity to Consent

Freely given consent has long been the sine qua non of a valid marriage.242
U.S. marriage law derives from contract law three basic requirements for valid
consent: legal capacity, mental or cognitive competence, and voluntariness
(absence of duress or undue influence).243
Legal capacity refers to the presumptive ability to enter binding contracts at
all. The law variously withholds from certain categories of individuals the
power to enter contracts, or it refuses to enforce against categories of
individuals agreements they have made.244 Categorical capacity/incapacity
reflects a determination that an identifiable group of individuals predictably
lacks some characteristic necessary to perform an act of legal consequence.
Enslaved people, married women, minors, and the mentally ill have all been
denied legal capacity at some point in the history of the United States.245 Into
the nineteenth century, for example, women lost their separate legal identities
upon marrying, as well as the capacity to take legal action in their own names
absent their husbands’ concurrence.246
The requirement of legal capacity today operates to exclude fewer
categories of individuals than it once did, instead more narrowly aiming to
identify those whose members lack a minimum level of cognitive and
decisionmaking competence. Minors and the mentally ill continue to
presumptively lack legal capacity; the members of both groups are deemed to
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To consent is “[v]oluntarily to accede to or acquiesce in what another proposes or
desires; to agree, comply, yield.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press
ed., 2d ed. 1989).
243 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12-16 (1981); id. § 12 cmt. a (defining
capacity as “the legal power which a normal person would have under the same
circumstances,” thus contemplating both legal capacity and mental competency).
244 Id. § 12.
245 Id. § 12 cmt. b. Contract law distinguishes incompetence due to pathological mental
illness from age-related immaturity. Thus in discussing the “wide variety of types” of
mental incompetency, the Restatement (Second) includes “congenital deficiencies in
intelligence, the mental deterioration of old age, the effects of brain damage caused by
accident or organic disease, and mental illnesses evidenced by such symptoms as delusions,
hallucinations, delirium, confusion and depression.” Id. § 15 cmt. b.
246 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43. A wife’s legal personhood was
“incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.” Id. at *430.
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possess insufficient judgment and understanding to enter an agreement to
which they should be held.247
The other requirements for legally valid consent – mental/cognitive
competence and voluntariness – protect otherwise-capable individuals from the
effects of agreements entered under conditions that in some way deprived them
of capacity to consent. An otherwise mentally competent individual, for
example, might escape a contract entered during a period of temporary
incapacity, such as intoxication. Avoiding a contract by demonstrating
incompetence is difficult, however, as the competence required for a legally
enforceable contract is relatively minimal. The competence required to
contract marriage, for example, requires simply that individuals “understand
the rights, duties, and responsibilities of marriage at the time of the marriage
contract.”248
Lastly, valid consent requires voluntariness – that is, consent given absent
duress or undue influence. “Duress” induces a person to manifest assent to a
contract as a result of a threat that leaves no reasonable alternative.249 “Undue
influence” results in a person’s manifesting assent to a contract because of the
use of unfair persuasion by someone in position to dominate the person, or in a
position of trust.250 The lines between influence, persuasion, and coercion are
not sharply defined, of course, and decisions always occur within a specific
social context. Community norms and expectations shape preferences and can
influence resulting decisions.251 Individuals also may be influenced by more
direct persuasion. To require voluntariness is not to require that individuals do
not make decisions within analytical vacuums; instead, it aims to ensure a
minimum level of independent thought and volitional behavior.
Legally valid consent thus requires cognitive and decisionmaking
competence – an individual must have legal capacity (itself a proxy for
247 Minors gain legal capacity once they reach the age of majority, and upon gaining or
regaining capacity, both minors and the mentally ill may elect to either ratify or disaffirm an
agreement entered during their period of incapacity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 12; see also Hunt v. Hunt, 412 S.W.2d 7, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (holding
that a person who lacks mental competence at the time marriage was entered may
nonetheless ratify the decision to marry upon regaining competence and by doing so
validate the marriage); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 547, 560 (2000).
248 Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
249 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-177.
250 Id. § 176. As is the case with nonage, however, a person who enters a marriage under
duress or as a result of undue influence may choose later to either invalidate or ratify the
marriage contract. Id. General contract law provides that if the other party to the
transaction induced the assent, the contract is voidable, but if a third party induced the
assent without the knowledge of the other party to the transaction, who has in good faith
relied on the contract, the contract is valid. Id. Courts deciding the validity of marriages
allegedly entered under duress or undue influence have not applied this exception, however.
251 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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presumptively adequate cognitive and decisionmaking abilities), must be
competent to understand the nature of marriage and the marital obligation, and
must undertake it voluntarily.252
2.

Capacity to Sustain

It is one thing to make a marital commitment; it is another to keep it. Some
functional aspects of marriage and marital family life have remained largely
unchanged over time – couples generally share a household, bear and raise
children, and assume obligations of financial support. Other aspects of married
life have changed drastically. This Article argues that a historic confluence of
economic and cultural developments has fundamentally altered modern
marriages and also the capacities required for them to flourish. These
developments have rendered marriage more difficult to sustain than at any time
in history.
First, economic changes have significantly altered the means by which
married couples are most likely to support their families and achieve financial
security. The disappearance of home and agricultural production, then of the
family wage, have pushed both members of marital couples into the paid
workforce. And now virtually all non-menial jobs require “credentials” of
some sort – increasingly, a college degree.253 Young people with a high school
education or less are likely to experience “several years of career instability
characterized by periods of unemployment and a series of dead-end, minimumwage jobs.”254 The financial instability linked to low educational attainment
decreases the ability to comfortably support a family and increases marital
stress and the likelihood of marital dissolution.255
Second, cultural understandings of and expectations for marriage have
changed significantly. Today’s normative marriage is a union of soulmates
who share intimacy and romantic love, and who foster each other’s personal
growth and fulfillment. As the division of labor within marriages has become
less gendered, moreover, so too has the marital relationship itself; it is no
longer a presumptive hierarchy in which wives submit to their husbands’
authority. Instead, marriage has become a more complex partnership of
equals, who now must negotiate market and household work and childrearing
in an egalitarian manner.256
252

Part III.B examines the age-related attainment of the capacity to consent.
Marilyn J. Montgomery & James E. Cote, College as a Transition to Adulthood, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 149, 156 (Gerald R. Adams & Michael D.
Berzonsky eds., 2003). On average, an individual with a bachelor’s degree has between
twenty and forty percent higher earnings than a high school graduate. Id.
254 Fred W. Vondracek & Erik J. Porfeli, The World of Work and Careers, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 253, at 109, 120.
255 See supra notes 116, 212-13 and accompanying text.
256 One study comparing the reasons given by couples for their divorces between 1949
253
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Researchers have sought to increase the likelihood of couples successfully
meeting the relational challenges of the modern marriage. They have observed
that modern marriage requires partners to “continually negotiate the bargain
and invest in the joint enterprise on an intimate, interpersonal level.” 257 It calls
for ongoing, open, and mature communication – and significant effort. The
relational demands of the modern marriage are different in nature and exceed
in scope the demands of the institutionalized and companionate marriages of
the past, and they “call[] for a level of personal responsibility and skill that
perhaps only a small minority of men and women achieved in the past.”258
Scholars who study psychology and culture have described key
psychological characteristics of individuals who are much more likely than
others to have attained the mature levels of commitment and the
communication, negotiation, and interpersonal skills that underpin the marital
relationship:
[They] are secure in their unique identities as individuals beyond societal
roles, including gender roles. [Individuals possessing secure personal
identities are better able to] interact in productive work and love
relationships[,] . . . exhibit greater capacity for both autonomy from and
intimacy with others[,] and are able to commit themselves to projects and
people.259
Attaining a distinct and secure personal identity and developing
sophisticated relational skills go hand in hand. Individuals who “develop
personal identities and a sense of self-worth before they enter marriages . . .
[will more readily develop] greater awareness of self and other [sic] as
individuals and greater skill in personal communication” 260 – skills that equip
them to negotiate the demands of the modern marriage, enhance relational
quality, and ultimately improve their chances of enjoying long-term marital
success.
B.

The Age-Related Attainment of Marital Capacity

The following Sections draw on research in the developmental sciences to
identify the age or age range by which individuals will have reliably attained
and 1996 in the Netherlands found that “[t]he reasons for divorce appear to have shifted
from behavioral problems to relational problems.” Paul M. de Graaf & Matthijs Kalmijn,
Divorce Motives in a Period of Rising Divorce: Evidence from a Dutch Life-History Survey,
27 J. FAM. ISSUES 483, 503 (2006). Couples have thus become less likely to cite behaviors
such as violence or infidelity as causes for their divorce, and more likely to cite
dissatisfaction with their relationships – growing apart, receiving insufficient attention,
inability to talk to one another, etc. Women also increasingly cite dissatisfaction with the
division of household labor. Id.
257 Vannoy, supra note 115, at 259.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 252.
260 Id. at 263.
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each aspect of marital capacity – the cognitive and decisionmaking capacities
required to voluntarily consent to marriage, and the relational capacities
required to sustain it.
1.

Cognitive Maturity in Adolescence and Capacity to Consent

This Section aims to identify the age or age range by which young people
have the capacity to “understand the rights, duties, and responsibilities of
marriage”261 and in light of that understanding, determine also whether they
are able to make a voluntary choice to enter marriage.
Cognitive capacity, including learning and reasoning from facts and
information processing, improves more or less linearly throughout childhood,
Researchers have
reaching adult-like levels by mid-adolescence.262
consistently found “the logical reasoning and basic information-processing
abilities of 16-year-olds” to be “comparable to . . . [or] essentially
indistinguishable” from those of adults.263 By mid-adolescence, thinking
processes are adult-like. According to developmental psychologist David
Moshman, “[n]o theorist or researcher has ever identified a form or level of
thinking routine among adults that is rarely seen in adolescents.”264
By ages fifteen or sixteen, adolescents have attained adult-like cognitiveprocessing capacities. In other words, they are as able as are adults to acquire,
retain, and retrieve relevant information and apply to that information
reasoning processes that lead to justifiable conclusions. They thus can
understand the nature of marriage and its requirements, and they have the
ability to make a rational decision whether to marry or not.
One might argue, however, that assent to marriage in spite of the slim
chances of relationship success itself renders the typical young person’s
consent to marriage irrational and therefore evidence of cognitive
incompetence. That argument fails, however. Although it is arguably true that
the adolescent’s or emerging adult’s decision to marry must be irrational (in
light of its near-inevitable failure), the decisional defect exhibited by
adolescents here does not differ significantly from the same defect
demonstrated by adults on the verge of marrying. Studies have shown, for
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Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).
Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOL. 583, 590-92 (2009). In previous work, I have summarized in some detail research
in developmental neuroscience and psychology that has begun to explain the development
of adolescents’ decisionmaking capacities. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion,
Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1449, 150713 (2012); Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055,
1110-16.
263 Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking,
28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 80 (2008).
264 DAVID MOSHMAN, ADOLESCENT RATIONALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (3d ed. 2011).
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example, that even when they know the statistical likelihood of marital failure
to be around 50%, adults estimated the likelihood of their marriages
succeeding to approach 100%.265 Given that the belief in the exceptionalism of
one’s impending union is characteristic of adults, the presence of the same
characteristic in adolescent marital decisionmaking is insufficient to justify
recharacterizing their consent as irrational or incompetent. To do so would
subject adolescents to a higher standard of rationality in decisionmaking than
that to which the state currently holds adults.
Adolescents’ decisionmaking capacities are more susceptible than are
adults’, however, to being confounded by the real-world contexts in which they
make decisions.266 Studies found that contexts that predictably compromise
adolescent decisionmaking include those requiring them to make decisions “in
the heat of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in
unfamiliar situations, . . . [and] when behavioral inhibition is required for good
outcomes.”267 In other words, adolescents tend to make bad decisions in
emotionally charged or pressured situations, and they struggle to control
impulses that lead to undesirable behavior.268 Thus when they must make
265
See JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT & JOSEPH SCHWAB, THE CLARK UNIVERSITY POLL OF
EMERGING ADULTS 16 (2012).
266 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental
Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005); Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Is
the Teen Brain Too Rational?, 17 SCI. AM. MIND 58, 60 (2007) [hereinafter Reyna & Farley,
Teen Brain]. Cognitive researchers have referred to this as the “competence-performance
distinction.” Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996).
Consistent with these observations, studies demonstrate that not all cognitive processes
mature by mid-adolescence. Some processes, such as certain aspects of working memory,
continue to specialize and develop into adulthood. Beatriz Luna et al., Maturation of
Cognitive Processes from Late Childhood to Adulthood, 75 CHILD DEV. 1357, 1367-68
(suggesting that all components of working memory mature by approximately age nineteen).
Working memory is involved in the voluntary control of behavior (including the ability to
filter irrelevant information and suppress inappropriate actions) and other complex mental
abilities. Id.
267 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision
Making, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 1 (2006) [hereinafter Reyna & Farley, Risk and
Rationality]; see also Eric Amsel et al., Anticipating and Avoiding Regret as a Model of
Adolescent Decision-Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING IN
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 119, 120 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005).
268 Reyna & Farley, Teen Brain, supra note 266, at 60; Reyna & Farley, Risk and
Rationality, supra note 267, at 1. Even though they do not generally misperceive risks (if
anything, studies have tended to show that adolescents and adults both overestimate risk),
adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits more heavily than risks, as compared to adults.
Researchers advance a number of theories, some related to cognition and some grounded in
neural development itself, to explain this. Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent
Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 12, 19-20 (2008); see also Beatriz
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decisions quickly or under time pressure, when they are highly emotional or
stressed, when they are in unfamiliar situations, or when they are subjected to
external or peer pressure, adolescents’ decisionmaking suffers.
Some adolescents will consider whether to marry under unpressured,
considered circumstances, but many will not. An individual’s manifestation of
assent is invalid if given involuntarily.269 Adolescents may be pressured to
marry by their older adult partners, parents, or other authority figures (such as
religious leaders). Couples faced with unintentional pregnancy may be
pressured to marry by parents or partners.
Even though some adolescents will consider marriage under stressful
situations, it is a decisionmaking context that differs, for example, from
impulsive and peer-influenced decisions to commit a crime, or even engage in
sexual activity itself.270 Instead, entering marriage is generally the sort of
considered decision that researchers have found adolescents capable of making
even under less-than-ideal conditions.
Researchers analyzing the
decisionmaking processes of adolescent girls confronted with unintended
pregnancies, for example, found that those aged “14 to 17 appear to be similar
to legal adults in both cognitive competence and volition.”271 Researchers also
found that these adolescents “remain competent decision makers when facing
an emotionally challenging real world decision.”272
Research thus suggests that adolescents, by ages fifteen or sixteen, have the
presumptive capacity to consent to marry. There are undoubtedly cases where
duress or undue influence will have rendered their consent involuntary. That
circumstances exist in individual cases that would legally vitiate or invalidate
expressed consent does not, however, extinguish adolescents’ presumptive
capacity to give what qualifies as legally valid consent.
2.

Psychosocial Development, the Prolonged Life Course to Adulthood,
and Incapacity to Sustain Modern Marriage

The previous Section argued that adolescents have the cognitive capacity to
consent to marriage. This Section argues that they lack other capacities
Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in 37 ADVANCES
IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 237-38 (Patricia Bauer ed., 2009) [hereinafter
Luna, Developmental Changes].
269 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-177 (1981).
270 See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers,
and the Sting to “The Age of Consent,” 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 113-15 (2012) (proposing that a
minor’s consent to sex with an adult should be legally binding unless the minor voids assent
during minority). At least two-thirds of U.S. adolescents have had sex by twelfth grade.
Lisa J. Crockett, et al., Adolescent Sexuality: Behavior and Meaning, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 253, at 371, 373.
271 Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129,
148 (1992).
272 Id.
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required to sustain the modern marriage. In light of the empirical evidence of
the instability and costs of early marriage, the appropriate inquiry in this
Section might not be whether adolescents and emerging adults are capable of
sustaining marriage, but instead why it is that they are not. This Section argues
that the answer lies in the same historic confluence of cultural and structural
factors that have made marriage more difficult for all couples to sustain, but is
compounded for young people by developmental factors that shape the social
and individual context in which they enter and endeavor to sustain marriage.
For individuals who marry before age twenty-two, the odds of sustaining
marriage are significantly worse than they are for those who delay marriage to
age twenty-two. Delaying marriage even further continues to increase marital
stability, but the gains of delay lessen thereafter.273 Neither attaining age
eighteen, the near-universal age of majority and of presumptive marital
capacity, nor obtaining the consent of parents and/or judges (a requirement
universally imposed on those individuals seeking to marry prior to reaching
eighteen) have an observable effect on marital stability. Only delay, along
with a number of factors integrally associated with it, reliably increases marital
stability.
Why are marriages entered before the early twenties so much less stable
than those entered later? First, developmental scientists have amassed
evidence that individuals do not reach psychosocial maturity until their early
twenties. Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett has identified the period from age
eighteen to twenty-five as what is now widely acknowledged to be a distinct
developmental period in the modern life course, and which he has termed
“emerging adulthood.”274
Developmental neuroscientists have begun to explain the neurological bases
for the coexistence of adolescent cognitive maturity and socio-emotional
immaturity. They have begun developing a neurologically based model
primarily oriented around the development in two neural systems of the brain:
that associated with cognitive control, and that associated with socio-emotional
maturity. The core insight of this dual-systems model is that these two neural
systems develop along different timelines.275 This temporal disjunction has the
potential to explain adolescents’ impulsivity and poor decisionmaking in some
contexts despite their improved cognitive ability, as well as other aspects of
adolescent psychology and behavior.276

273

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A CULTURAL
APPROACH 14 (2001).
275 Steinberg, supra note 263, at 97–98; see also Laurence Steinberg et al., Age
Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report:
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008)
(finding that “[n]eurobiological evidence in support of the dual systems model is rapidly
accumulating”).
276 See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text. For slightly different accounts of the
274
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As discussed above, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities are mature by age
sixteen, giving them the capacity to process information and make rational
decisions. But a heightened sensitivity to rewards that increases and peaks
around mid-adolescence inclines them towards risk taking, sensation seeking,
and impulsivity. These inclinations may dominate or overwhelm their
cognitive processes and shape their behaviors, especially in situations
triggering heightened emotion or pressure.277 Adolescents’ susceptibility to
the confounding influence of heightened reward salience on their
decisionmaking begins to decline after mid-adolescence, however, while their
abilities to exercise cognitive control increase, ultimately reaching mature
levels in their twenties.278
Most adolescents and emerging adults actively engage in a period of identity
exploration most evident in the contexts of work, worldviews, and intimate
relationships.279 First theorized by Erik Erikson, identity formation is a
gradual process that occurs most intensely during adolescence.280 During this
period, individuals’ beliefs, commitments and relationships tend to be in flux
as they “actively explor[e] possibilities for self-definition, which may require
questioning or rejecting previously held beliefs.”281 In the late 1960s, Erikson
observed that the period of identity formation was prolonged in industrialized
societies, and psychologists now believe that most identity development
continues through late adolescence and into the twenties.282 Following a
period of exploration, individuals ideally reach identity achievement, a more
stable (though not unchanging) identity status whereby they commit to

dual-systems model, see B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV.
62, 63 (2008), Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 216 (2009), and
Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of
Ostracism in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of
the dual-systems model).
277 Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 268, at 257; Steinberg, supra note 263, at
97–98. Researchers have more generally found the following personality traits and
contextual factors correlated with suboptimal choices: sensation seeking, impulsivity,
competitiveness, overconfidence, and the presence of peers. James P. Byrnes, Cognitive
Development During Adolescence, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note
253, at 227, 236.
278 Luna, Developmental Changes, supra note 268, at 257; Steinberg, supra note 263, at
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281 Doug Hamman & C. Bret Hendricks, The Role of the Generations in Identity
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PSYCHOLOGY 159, 160 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980).
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personal, occupational, and ideological choices.283 Some studies have found
that both females and emerging adults who do not attend college progress
towards identity achievement somewhat faster than others.284 Even for noncollege adolescents and emerging adults and for females, however, the
majority have not reached identity achievement by age twenty-one, and
researchers have only recently begun conducting studies of identity
achievement beyond this age.285
This research has significant implications for adolescents’ and emerging
adults’ capacity to sustain marriage. Modern marriage demands relationship
skills and requires levels of emotional maturity that were not required to
sustain the marriages of the past. Indeed, the changed meaning and function of
marriage requires a level of maturity that young people will not achieve until
their early twenties. Individuals’ development before marriage of personal
identities and relational skills, which comes only with time and life experience,
promises to improve the likelihood of marriages’ success and endurance.286
Finally, adolescents will not have attained the postsecondary education or
work experience increasingly required to obtain well-paying work in an
information- and technology-based post-industrial economy.287 Low-paying
work and occupational instability hinders the ability to support a family, and
financial insecurity stresses the marital relationship. Indeed, the higher levels
of education required in order to obtain entry into better-paying work has
contributed to young people’s postponing marriage and childbearing.288
Research on adolescent development thus suggests that, in light of ongoing
psychological and brain development, as well as the relatively prolonged life
course to adulthood in the postindustrial society, young individuals do not
attain marital capacity until their early twenties. The empirical evidence of the
instability of marriages entered earlier supports this conclusion. The rising age
of marriage, falling rates of adolescent childbearing, and growing investment
in education all reflect appropriate adaptation to the modern cultural and
economic context. The law, however, has yet to similarly adapt.
C.

Correcting Regulatory Lag: Raising the Age of Presumptive Marital
Capacity

Through a single statutory adjustment – raising the age at which individuals
may marry – legislators could reduce the percentage of marriages ending in
283
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divorce, improve women’s mental and physical health, and elevate women’s
and children’s socioeconomic status.
1.

Policy Considerations

Public support of marriage is costly. State and federal government subsidize
marital families, which receive billions of dollars annually in direct and
indirect benefits.289 Divorce, too, is costly. Particularly for mothers who have
forgone education and work experience within marriages, post-divorce life is
more difficult than never-married life. At least some will turn to the state for
public assistance to help support their families.
There is a growing body of evidence that young people do not achieve
marital capacity until their early twenties. And there is overwhelming
empirical evidence that early marriage ultimately harms the individuals who
marry (women in particular), provides little if any benefit to children, and
imposes significant costs on society.
To avoid the worst of these social costs, states should consider raising the
presumptive age of marital capacity to twenty-one or twenty-two. Empirical
evidence suggests that delaying marriage to twenty-two would result in the
most effective increase in stability. While stability continues to improve every
year after age twenty-two, it does so at a much slower rate. At the same time,
a number of age-related rights already accrue at twenty-one.290 Given its
current existence as a marker of maturity, then, there may be less political
resistance to having the right to marry also accrue at twenty-one.
States would do well to remove altogether statutory exceptions allowing
adolescents younger than eighteen to marry. Again, however, given that age
eighteen is currently the age of legal majority in most states and thus a marker
of adult entitlement, there may be less public resistance to a policy change that
retained eighteen as the minimum marital age, but that required young people
between eighteen and twenty-one to obtain judicial (not parental) approval
before obtaining a marriage license. Parental approval has provided little or no
safeguard against the instability of early marriages. Statutes might thus impose
clearer (and higher) standards for judicial approval.
2.

Constitutional Considerations

For young people wanting to marry, state regulations denying them that
ability constrain their liberty. After the Supreme Court explicitly declared
marriage to be a fundamental right,291 young couples challenged the age-based
regulations imposed by several states as unconstitutional infringements on their
right to marry. None of these challenges succeeded, however, and the courts
have universally found marital age restrictions to be constitutionally
289
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acceptable.292 Age restrictions, courts have reasoned, do not deny couples the
right to marry but instead merely delay their entry into marriage and thus do
not constitute the sort of substantial interference with the fundamental right to
marry that the Supreme Court has held impermissible.293
States remain free to extend greater liberties than those minimally required
by the Constitution, and as discussed above, many states have done so. The
statutes that allow adolescents to marry, however, are not constitutionally
compelled.
The right to direct the upbringing and education of one’s children has also
been deemed fundamental.294 Parents retain this right until their children reach
the age of majority, although the state’s role as parens patriae justifies
widespread measures (for example, compulsory education requirements) aimed
at ensuring the well-being of minors. Provisions requiring minors to obtain
parental consent prior to marrying thus reflect respect for deference to parental
authority; but they also delegate to parents the task of ensuring the adequate
maturity of those minors wishing to marry. As this Article has argued, the
empirical evidence makes clear that this delegation is – at best – an
unsuccessful one.
CONCLUSION
In the preindustrial economy, marriage served pragmatic ends – ensuring
economic survival through combined spousal effort, ideally aided by the labor
of children. Expectations of the marital relationship were similarly pragmatic.
The structural and cultural changes of postindustrial society have forced
fundamental change on the institution of marriage: economic security
increasingly requires extended formal education; increased gender equality and
the availability of market work has eliminated the inevitability of women’s
economic dependence on marriage; divorce makes available a relatively
destigmatized exit from unsuccessful unions; and cultural changes have raised
the expectations of marital relationship, rendering it an intense intimate
relationship, and substantially more difficult to sustain than in the past.
The steady rise in the median age at first marriage to what are now historic
highs for both men and women evinces popular acknowledgement of, and
adaptation to, the new social context of marriage. The continued existence of
too-early marriages, however, unnecessarily imposes significant costs – on
early marriers, their children, and society. The state does well to respect
individuals’ life choices, even when improvident. When those choices impose
sufficiently high costs on others, however, the state and its legal institutions
abrogate their proper roles by failing to respond appropriately. The high costs
imposed by early marriage require a legal response through which the law, too,
292
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adapts to the new social context within which its members enter and endeavor
to sustain marriage.

